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SAVING PRIVACY FROM HISTORY
Samantha Barbas*
INTRODUCTION
We are in the midst of a privacy panic.1 Panicking about privacy is
nothing new; we have been worried about privacy and its loss for over
a hundred years now, since at least 1890, when Warren and Brandeis
wrote The Right to Privacy, the foundational text of the tort law of
privacy. 2 Warren and Brandeis envisioned the "right to privacy" as a
means to address what were perceived as serious threats to privacy
and identity posed by the new media of the day-yellow journalism,
gossip columns, and kodak photography. Our privacy concerns are
arguably more intense now, and with good reason-new technologies
can track our thoughts, movements, and intimacies and expose them
to a global audience in an instant. We have very little privacy, and we
have not gotten over it.3
It is widely recognized that the tort action proposed by Warren and
Brandeis, written into law in most states over the twentieth century,
failed to provide the kind of protection against the media that the
authors had envisioned.4 As many have convincingly argued, tort pri-
vacy is especially inadequate to address the needs of the twenty-first
century, when new technologies magnify privacy injuries.5 There have
* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. J.D., Stanford Law
School; Ph.D., History, University of California Berkeley.
1. See, e.g., Harry Lewis, How Facebook Spells the End of Privacy, Bos. GLOBE, June 14,
2008, at All; Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 25, 2010, at 32;
Daniel J. Solove, The End of Privacy?, Sci. AM., Sept. 2008, at 101; Richard Stengel, The End of
Privacy? Not Yet, TIME, Mar. 21, 2011, at 4.
2. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
3. The oft-cited phrase, "You have zero privacy anyway, get over it," has been attributed to
Scott McNealy, former CEO of Sun Microsystems. Private Lives? Not Ours!, PCWORLD (Apr.
18, 2000, 12:00 AM), http://www.pcworld.com.article/16331/private lives not ours.html.
4. See generally Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983). See also Jonathan B. Mintz, The Re-
mains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425,
426 (1996) (pronouncing the privacy tort "dead"); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Pros-
ser's Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1889 (2010) ("Today, the chorus of
opinion is that the tort law of privacy has been ineffective, particularly in remedying the bur-
geoning collection, use, and dissemination of personal information in the Information Age.").
5. See generally Patricia Sanchez Abril, Perspective, A (My)Space of One's Own: On Privacy
and Online Social Networks, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73 (2007); Danielle Keats Citron,
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been numerous suggestions for legal reform; existing laws have been
deconstructed, analyzed, and criticized.6 Yet the law of privacy has
not been sufficiently historicized, to our detriment.7 The premise of
this Article is that an important key to the reform of the tort law of
privacy lies in understanding its historical evolution.
This Article focuses on the history of the privacy tort, which permits
damages for dignitary injuries caused by unwanted and embarrassing
publicity of private facts and images.8 Currently, publicly disclosing
"a matter concerning the private life of another" constitutes a tort in
most states if it "would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805 (2010); Neil M. Richards, The Limits of
Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 357 (2011). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Lec-
ture, Tucker Lecture, Law and Media Symposium, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1449, 1449-50
(2009) ("Even now, the cases about public disclosure of private facts do not seem to pay much
attention to whether it is occurring in newspapers, radio, television, or the Internet. Here, too,
the tort has developed and been refined unaffected by how the media has grown and changed.").
6. See, e.g., JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT (2008); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY
IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010); Josh
Blackman, Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in Public, and the Right to Your Digital Identity: A
Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual's Image over the Internet, 49 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 313 (2009); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis's Right to Privacy, 45 BRAN-
DEIS L.J. 643 (2007); Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial
Regulation of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039 (2009); Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech,
and "Blurry-Edged" Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315 (2009); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Map-
ping Online Privacy, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 477 (2010); Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy
Law out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV.
989 (1995); Connie Davis Powell, "You Already Have Zero Privacy. Get over It!" Would War-
ren and Brandeis Argue for Privacy for Social Networking?, 31 PACE L. REV. 146 (2011); Daniel
J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53
DUKE L.J. 967 (2003); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV. 919 (2005); Jaime A. Madell, Note, The Poster's Plight: Bringing the Public Disclosure
Tort Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 895 (2011).
7. The history of the Warren and Brandeis tort has been misrepresented, misunderstood, and
underutilized in much of the legal scholarship. The standard account begins with the 1890 War-
ren and Brandeis article, goes to the famous 1960 law review article, Privacy, by William Prosser,
then to the present day. This narrative overemphasizes the writings of legal theorists and fails to
appreciate the interesting and important work taking place in the courts, and in twentieth-
century American culture more broadly, in defining the contours of the right to privacy and the
boundaries of acceptable publicity. For works that incorporate a historical approach, see Ran-
dall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 1890-1990,
80 CALIF. L. REV. 1133 (1992); Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren's The Right to Pri-
vacy and the Birth of the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623 (2002); Robert C. Post, The
Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV.
957 (1989); Rodney A. Smolla, Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27
NOVA L. REV. 289 (2002); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004); Zimmerman, supra note 4.
8. In 1960, William Prosser divided the privacy tort into four branches: (1) intrusion upon the
seclusion of another, (2) unreasonable publicity given to another's private life, (3) appropriation
of another's name and likeness, and (4) publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light
before the public. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). The cases
discussed in this Article primarily fall under the second and fourth branches.
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is not of legitimate concern to the public."9 Mass media publicity is
not a required element of the tort, although the right to privacy was
conceived as a legal response to the perceived abuses of the popular
press. A significant number of tort privacy cases have involved media
defendants, and these cases are the focus of this Article.10
Under the privacy tort, liability can be imposed for the publicity of
material that is "private." According to the prevailing doctrine, most
anything that takes place outside the home is not private, nor is infor-
mation disclosed to even a few other persons. Thus, an intimate scene
outdoors, such as a burial, or a secret shared with a group of friends
can be "public" under the law." On the issue of what is a privileged
matter of public concern, or "newsworthy," courts have often deferred
to the media. Gruesome photos, stories of accidents and crimes, and
the embarrassing details of an individual's personal life have been
held to be newsworthy matters of public concern apparently by virtue
of the fact that they appeared in the press.12
These rules fail to capture the complex and nuanced ways that we
understand and experience privacy in real life. They are also out-
dated. They were, for the most part, created several decades ago, in
the period roughly between the 1920s and the 1950s. The rules were
built around a set of assumptions about the nature of personal identity
in mass society, the capabilities and limitations of existing technolo-
gies, and the social functions of the mass media. Social norms of pri-
vacy, and media institutions and technologies, have transformed
dramatically since then, yet the law clings to its mid-twentieth-century
foundations.
In what follows, I present the social and cultural roots of modern
tort privacy doctrine and a summary of the evolution of the law from
its nineteenth-century origins to the present. Though the Article dis-
cusses changes internal to the law, it explains the law's development
primarily as a function of shifting social, cultural, and technological
contexts. It explains why the privacy tort fell short of its creators' ex-
pectations and why a nation that has been so solicitous of privacy in
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
10. This Article also addresses related state privacy statutes applied to media publications,
most notably that of New York. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2009).
11. See Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 943.
12. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940); Goelet v. Confiden-
tial, Inc., 171 N.Y.S.2d 223, 226, 227 (App. Div. 1958); Abernathy v. Thornton, 83 So. 2d 235, 237
(Ala. 1955); Jenkins v. Dell Publ'g Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1958); Shulman v. Group W
Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 488, 489 (Cal. 1998); Linda N. Woito & Patrick McNulty, The Privacy
Disclosure Tort and the First Amendment: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness?, 64
IOWA L. REV. 185, 195-96 (1979).
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many respects has fostered a press that is freer to invade privacy than
perhaps any other in the world.
In 1890, Warren and Brandeis argued that there were strict divisions
between public and private life and that every person, from the fa-
mous to the unknown, had a broad and inviolable "zone" of personal
privacy. The unauthorized publication of a person's portrait, or facts
about her personal affairs, not only produced dignitary injuries, but
also had a damaging effect on public morals. These principles became
the bases of early court decisions and legal commentaries that recog-
nized and endorsed a tort remedy for invasions of privacy by the
press. By the 1940s, however, this view of privacy and its legal protec-
tion had been transformed, and the groundwork established for a new
legal model of privacy.
Under this new model, gossip columns, "human interest" stories,
and other displays of private life in the media were no longer categori-
cally a social evil, but potentially served important public functions.
Both social need and constitutional mandates required their relatively
free and unfettered circulation. Courts reasoned that by virtue of liv-
ing in a "culture of exposure" with an inquisitive public, aggressive
and intrusive journalists, and technologies for disseminating words
and images on a mass scale, every person assumed the risk of mass
media publicity by doing nothing more than participating in the activi-
ties of daily life. Courts also concluded that the conditions of modern
life, where people had their privacy assaulted daily by the telephone,
questionnaires, census takers, and "the candid camera" had desensi-
tized the public to invasions of privacy, making them unlikely to suffer
serious dignitary harms from media exposure.13 Only depictions that
were overtly uncomplimentary would potentially warrant damages for
invasion of privacy. These assumptions, written into law, often pre-
cluded recovery for invasions of privacy in cases involving media
defendants.14
Despite the weakness of privacy law, extra-legal forces-editorial
practices and professional ethics codes, the inherent limitations of ex-
isting media technologies, and social norms of privacy-provided safe-
guards against deeply intrusive and humiliating media exposures. In
the post-World War II era, however, many of those safeguards dimin-
ished without increases in legal protection. Today journalists are more
likely to seek out and publish intimate personal information than in
13. Meyer Berger, Surrender of Privacy, SCRIBNER'S MAG., Apr. 1939, at 16, 16.
14. In 1983, Diane Zimmerman wrote that she found "fewer than 18 cases in which a plaintiff"
either won or stated a cause of action for public disclosure. Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 293
n.5.
[Vol. 61:973976
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the past, the public is less likely to restrain them, and new media and
technologies pose unprecedented threats to privacy with the potential
for significant dignitary and reputational injuries. This new technolog-
ical and social environment urges a reconsideration of the role of law
in the protection of privacy, and privacy law's foundational premises
and norms.
This Article does not undertake a theoretical discussion of the im-
portance of privacy, which has been done extensively elsewhere.15
Rather, it assumes that a certain amount of privacy is necessary for a
healthy, liberal, democratic society and that unwanted publicity of
personal life can be harmful under many circumstances.16 Nor does it
resolve the familiar free speech question.17 It acknowledges that pri-
vacy and free speech may be in tension, but insists that they are not
antithetical.18 It proceeds from the belief that privacy is a value that
the law should prioritize and protect, and that it may do so without
impinging on our legitimate informational needs.
Part II begins with the origins of the Warren and Brandeis tort in
1890. It details the emergence of what I describe as the turn-of-the-
century model of legal privacy in cases and legal commentary around
1900.19 Part III focuses on the second, foundational phase of modern
privacy law during the period between the two world wars, when the
earlier model of privacy was transformed. A burgeoning celebrity cul-
ture, new photographic and media technologies, developing styles and
genres of journalism, and the liberalization of free speech law created
the conditions under which courts determined that the right to privacy
must, on balance, yield to the public's "right to know" about the per-
sonal affairs of others. Part IV then examines the entrenchment of
15. See, e.g., STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2008); NISSENBAUM,
supra note 6, at 67-88; Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Ruth Gavison, Lecture,
Too Early for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis Were Right on Privacy vs. Free Speech, 43 S.C. L.
REV. 437 (1992); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26
(1976).
16. See THOMAS NAGEL, The Shredding of Public Privacy, in CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE
27, 29 (2002); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 11 (2000); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); Ruth Gavison, Privacy
and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980).
17. See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black,
68 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1990); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1049 (2000).
18. See generally Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court
Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41 (1974); Gavison, supra note 15; Paul
Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 Sup. CT. REV. 139; Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amend-
ment Values of Privacy, 71 WASH. L. REV. 683 (1996); Solove, supra note 6.
19. See infra notes 22-134 and accompanying text.
2012] 977
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the doctrine in the postwar era and demonstrates how privacy law re-
mained static while the world around it changed.20 Part V concludes
by suggesting how an understanding of privacy law's past might be
used to save privacy from history.21
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, 1890-1920
Privacy has been described as a human need that is essential and
universal.22 It has been said that privacy is necessary for psychological
equilibrium, intimate relationships, and the ability to freely shape
one's identity; without it, souls destabilize, communities dissolve, and
relationships crumble.23 The efforts that cultures around the world
have historically taken to protect privacy testifies to its transcendent
and timeless nature. 24 At the same time, privacy is a concept that is
deeply contextual; it embodies beliefs and aspirations that are specific
to time, place, and culture.25 It is from this starting point-privacy as
a concept that is historically contingent, socially constructed, and at-
tuned to felt need and lived experience-that we will move forward.
The history of the modern United States is in part the story of revo-
lutions in privacy, of shifting boundaries between public and private
life. These changes have often yielded great public anxiety and pri-
vacy panics.26 The late 1800s saw one of the first major privacy panics.
In contrast to later periods, in which the primary threats to privacy
were described as the surveillance and data collection efforts of the
state, the concerns of this time focused on the mass-circulation press.27
20. See infra notes 135-488 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 487-519 and accompanying text.
22. See RICHARD F. HIXsON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY 3-25 (1987); see also Bezanson,
supra note 7, at 1134 ("The continuing impact of the Warren and Brandeis article is testament to
the timeless quality of the idea of privacy . . . .").
23. See WESTIN, supra note 16, at 39-42 (describing privacy as central to "intra-psychic bal-
ance"); Gavison, supra note 16, at 442.
24. See Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRI-
VACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 265 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984) (describing the need for
privacy to achieve human intimacy); WESTIN, supra note 16, at 11-22 (describing the "universal"
nature of privacy).
25. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGE-
MENT 72 (1995) ("[Tjhe public disclosure tort ... draws upon the social norms governing the
flow of information in modern society."); Bezanson, supra note 7, at 1134 ("The Right to Privacy
was a product of its time.... Warren and Brandeis presented the idea of privacy as it should be
understood: as deeply entrenched in culture, evolving over time, fundamental to the wholeness
of the individual, and reflecting the social environment in which people exist.").
26. See generally FREDERICK S. LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY: THE 400-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR
MOST CONTESTED RIGHT (2009); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L.
REV. 1335.
27. One eminent legal scholar suggests that the reason for the focus on the media's invasions
of privacy, rather than those committed by the state, is that "the technology of intrusion"-
[Vol. 61:973978
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As one newspaperman noted, writing about reportorial invasions,
"The newspaper dares rush in where government fears to tread." 28
The right to privacy originated as a response to the perceived assault
to privacy posed by the popular press; it was "the right to pass through
this world, if [one] wills, without having his picture published, his busi-
ness enterprises discussed . . . , or his eccentricities commented upon
either in handbills, circulars, catalogues, periodicals or newspapers." 29
A. Newspapers and the Privacy Panic
The late nineteenth century saw a transformation in American jour-
nalism, one marked by the rapid growth of the mass-circulation press
and new styles and conventions for pursuing and reporting the news.30
Most famously, this era saw the birth of yellow journalism, the notori-
ous brand of sensationalistic news reporting pioneered by publishers
Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst,31 and the populariza-
tion of human interest journalism, described by one publisher as
"chatty little reports of tragic or comic incidents in the lives of the
people."32 In its aim to present the news so that it read like entertain-
ment, human interest journalism publicized material from the dark re-
cesses of life: crime reports, gossip, and lurid romance. 33 Most
newspapers by the late nineteenth century ran gossip columns, and
some of the larger papers had separate columns dealing with politi-
cians, businessmen, society figures, writers, and athletes.34 As one
critic lamented, they allowed "hungry eyes [to] . . . peer into private
namely, wiretapping and electronic surveillance-"had [not] developed to the point where [they
were seen as] present[ing] the same threat to individuality as did lurid journalism." See Edward
J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 962, 983 (1964). By 1890, however, the telephone, telegraph, inexpensive portable cam-
eras, and sound recording devices had come into use. The "new journalism" of the time repre-
sented another force that "increased the vulnerability of individuals to having their actions,
words, images, and personalities communicated without their consent beyond the protected cir-
cle of family and chosen friends." Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21
ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 8 (1979).
28. SILAs BENT, BALLYHOO: THE VOICE OF THE PRESS 54 (1927).
29. Elbridge L. Adams, The Law of Privacy, 175 N. AM. REV. 361, 361 (1902).
30. See generally MICHAEL SCHUDsoN, DISCOVERING THE NEws: A SOCIAL HIsTORY OF
AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 88-120 (1978).
31. DAVID R. SPENCER, THE YELLOW JOURNALISM: THE PRESS AND AMERICA'S EMERGENCE
AS A WORLD POWER 16 (2007).
32. HELEN MAcGILL HUGHES, NEWS AND THE HUMAN INTEREST STORY 12-13 (1968).
33. See SCHUDSON, supra note 30, at 89; see also GERALD J. BALDASTY, THE COMMERCIALI-
ZATION OF NEWS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 139 (1992) ("In 1900, American newspapers
contained more than news of politics and business they were a colorful amalgam of general
news, sports, entertainment, comics, and even fiction.").
34. See CHARLES L. PONCE DE LEON, SELF-EXPOSURE: HUMAN INTEREST JOURNALISM AND
THE EMERGENCE OF CELEBRITY IN AMERICA, 1890-1940, at 3 (2002).
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houses, study banquets, balls, teas ... very much as spectators in the
parquet and boxes dwell upon scenes and tableaux behind the theater
foot-lights." 35 Though decried at the time as scandalously invasive,
the gossip was relatively benign by today's standards. When President
Grover Cleveland married while in office, reporters detailed only
where he stayed during his honeymoon, what he wore, and what he
ate. The coverage was widely criticized as a massive invasion of the
President's privacy.36
The popular press of the late nineteenth century made newspaper
reading a mass pastime.37 Between 1870 and 1900, as cities exper-
ienced extensive population growth from industrialization and immi-
gration, the circulation of daily newspapers increased 1,100%.38
Publishers courted urban workers by fashioning the newspaper as a
form of inexpensive entertainment.39 With their command over the
attention, if not the values, of their working- and middle-class reader-
ship, the popular press challenged the cultural authority of the social
elite and fed into what one writer has described as the "virtual para-
noia of the masses" among the upper class of that time.40 The press
also threatened the reputations of the wealthy and powerful by expos-
ing their pretenses and hypocrisies to public view. 41 In the words of
sociologist Edward Shils, the popular press allowed the public "to be
in proximity to the mighty, the famous, the glorious, the authoritative,
and to derogate them at the same time." 42
35. George T. Rider, The Pretensions of Journalism, 135 N. AM. REV. 471, 479 (1882).
36. JANNA MALAMUD SMITH, PRIVATE MATTERS: IN DEFENSE OF THE PERSONAL LIFE
188-89 (1997).
37. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
38. DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS 10-11 (1972).
39. William Randolph Hearst claimed that he published only those stories that "contain[ed]
that thrill of sensation loved by the man on the street and the woman in the kitchen." LEONARD
RAY TEEL, THE PUBLIC PRESS, 1900-1945: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 7 (2006).
40. Glancy, supra note 27, at 35.
41. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE's DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY 220-23 (2007).
42. Edward Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 281.,
293 (1966).
Affirmation and sacrilege were rendered simultaneously practicable by the activities of
the new profession of popular journalism. The result was a new sector of the profession
of journalism that regarded the penetration of the private sphere as its main occupa-
tional task. It justified this penetration by reference to the satisfaction of popular
desires and the freedom of the press unrestrainedly to enlighten the public.
Id. at 293-94.
980 [Vol. 61:973
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With its sensationalism and dramatic excess, the popular press was
also seen as a threat to upper-class norms of modesty and reticence.4 3
In this time, emotional self-control was lauded as a paramount vir-
tue,4 4 and the genteel person was to convey a restrained appearance in
public. It was only in private-in the home-that he could drop his
public "front" and reveal his feelings, desires, and true self.4 5 The pri-
vate sphere was the domestic realm of emotion, the body, and inti-
mate relationships; the public sphere was the domain of social and
commercial relations.4 6 In public, one kept his private affairs to him-
self and was "pained and distressed by anything resembling public-
ity." 4 7 Only the uncouth displayed their feelings and private affairs in
public and showed "the secrets of their homes, their social entertain-
ments and aspirations to the world." 48
Unwanted publicity of private life was thus seen as destructive of
the social order because it disturbed the formalized rituals of self-
presentation and ruptured the strict boundaries between public and
private life. As the critic E.L. Godkin had written in Scribner's Maga-
zine in 1890, gossip columns and human interest stories, by displaying
the intimacies of private life before a mass audience, interfered with a
person's prerogative to "decid[e] how much or how little the commu-
nity shall see of him, or know of him,... . to decide how much knowl-
edge . . . of his tastes, and habits, of his own private doings and affairs"
others would be able to access. 4 9 The development of hand-held "ko-
dak" cameras in the 1880s and new halftone printing techniques that
enabled the publication of photographs in newspapers intensified
these fears.5 0 One New York newspaper employed a photographer to
43. See ROCHELLE GURSTEIN, THE REPEAL OF RETICENCE: AMERICA'S CULTURAL AND LE-
GAL STRUGGLES OVER FREE SPEECH, OBSCENITY, SEXUAL LIBERATION, AND MODERN ART
32-33 (1996).
44. See WARREN I. SUSMAN, CULTURE As HISTORY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 273-77 (1984).
45. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1-2 (1959);
KAREN HALTFUNEN, CONFIDENCE MEN AND PAINTED WOMEN: A STUDY OF MIDDLE CLASS
CULTURE IN AMERICA, 1830-1870, at 104 (1982); JOHN F. KASSON, RUDENESS & CIVILITY:
MANNERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY URBAN AMERICA 116 (1990).
46. For a discussion of gender and the public-private distinction, see Barbara Welter, The Cult
of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 Am. Q. 151 (1966).
47. The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1902, at 8.
48. Old Principles Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 8, 1897, at 7.
49. E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen to His Own Reputation, SCRIBNER'S MAG.,
July-Dec., 1890, at 58, 65.
50. See Robert E. Mensel, "Kodakers Lying in Wait": Amateur Photography and the Right of
Privacy in New York, 1885-1915, 43 AM. 0. 24, 25 (1991). In 1888, George Eastman marketed
his new Kodak camera, which was advertised as simple, light, and designed for taking surrepti-
tious photographs of unwilling people. LANE, supra note 26, at 55. On halftone printing, see id.
at 54-55.
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stand in the street and take snapshots of every person who appeared
to be important.51 From the cameraman's perspective, the value of
such photos was not so much "that the photographs [were] of notabili-
ties," but that they were candid and often "taken by stealth when the
subjects were unconscious of the purpose of the person manipulating
the camera." 52 It was thought that photographs, particularly pictures
of the face, captured a person's soul and revealed the innermost iden-
tity of a person, especially when they were unposed. 53 The taking and
publishing of people's photographs without consent, even in public
places, was thus considered to be an assault to privacy because of the
photograph's inherently personal nature.
Ordinary back-fence gossip was not described as an invasion of pri-
vacy.5 4 When gossip circulated face to face, it was not permanently
injurious to one's dignity or reputation. It might eventually be forgot-
ten, the victim could perhaps rehabilitate herself, or the local commu-
nity, in its collective wisdom, might discredit the rumor. In the setting
of the small community, unflattering publicity was mediated by per-
sonal observations and social norms. This was not necessarily the case
when one's image or private affairs appeared in the press, unmoored
from context, displayed to a vast audience of strangers in permanent
print form. As one author noted in 1905:
So long as he is talked about by his neighbors, he is usually spared
the mortification of knowing it; but when his foibles, his family
secrets, the amount of his income, what he eats and drinks ... are
printed in the newspapers and published broadcast through the
community, ... he feels a natural resentment.55
Such publication inflicted on the subject "mental pain and distress, far
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury." 56 In a small
town, the victim could exact justice by "horsewhipping" the editor,
but that remedy was generally not available against the big-city pub-
lisher.57 Because the offenses of the yellow journals were "incompati-
51. The Rights of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1896, at 11.
52. Id.
53. See ALAN TRACHTENBERG, READING AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHS 27 (1989); Mensel, supra
note 50, at 31.
54. The right of privacy was aimed at the abuses of the press. According to Warren and Bran-
deis, the law would not grant redress for any harms suffered from oral communication. See
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 217.
55. Elbridge L. Adams, The Right of Privacy, and Its Relation to the Law of Libel, 39 AM. L.
REV. 37, 52 (1905).
56. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196.
57. See Adams, supra note 55, at 52. There were in fact stories about public figures who
"horsewhipped" aggressive newspaper cameramen. When the socialite Reginald Vanderbilt did
this, the New York Times commented that he had no choice because there were no "'legal mea-
sures' to prevent or avenge this outrage upon his privacy and his modesty." "The Right to Pri-
[Vol. 61:973982
SAVING PRIVACY FROM HISTORY
ble" with the norms of civilized society, the New York Times argued in
1902, "decent people will say that it is high time that there were . . . a
law."58
B. The Law of Privacy
Beginning in the 1890s, several states attempted to ban newspaper
and magazine "invasions of privacy" by statute. The legislature of
New York made "it a misdemeanor to publish any private letter, tele-
gram or papers found on [a] person" who had committed suicide or
been found dead.59 In 1899, the California legislature passed a privacy
statute that made it a misdemeanor to publish the portrait of any per-
son in a newspaper without the individual's consent; Pennsylvania
passed a similar law four years later;60 and Chicago passed an anti-
paparazzi law shortly thereafter. 61
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published their famous
Harvard Law Review article, The Right to Privacy,62 which is credited
with inventing the tort law of privacy and is generally considered the
starting point of the legal history of privacy in the United States.63
Warren was a wealthy and prominent Boston lawyer, and Brandeis
was his former law partner. Warren was incensed at finding details of
his family's home life and social affairs spread on the society pages of
several newspapers.64 More broadly, the authors were outraged by
the new trend of invasive news reporting and what they considered to
be the unwarranted and tasteless depiction of private life in the
vacy," N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1903, at 6; see also HENRY JAMES, THE REVERBERATOR (1949)
(involving a man's contemplated duel with a journalist who printed the details of his personal life
in a gossip sheet).
58. The Right to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1902, at 8.
59. Adams, supra note 29, at 367. In 1897, the New York legislature also passed a bill-
ultimately defeated by pressure from publishers-that made it a misdemeanor "to print or pub-
lish in any newspaper, periodical, pamphlet, or book any portrait or alleged portrait of any per-
son or individual .. . without having first obtained his or her written consent." The Protection of
Privacy, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 14, 1897, at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. PEMBER, supra note 38, at 64; Gormley, supra note 26, at 1354. The California provision
was repealed in 1915. Gormley, supra note 26, at 1354 n.90. The Pennsylvania law was repealed
in 1907. Id. at 1354 n.92.
61. See The Right to Privacy, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 6, 1905, at 10.
62. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2.
63. However, as Ruth Gavison notes, even before the 1890 article, privacy was protected
under other legal doctrines, such as contract, trespass, defamation, and breach of confidence.
See Gavison, supra note 16, at 464; see also HIxsoN, supra note 22, at 36; Bratman, supra note 7,
at 632-33; Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892,
1894-95 (1981).
64. PEMBER, supra note 38, at 21-23; see also Amy Gajda, What if Samuel D. Warren Hadn't
Married a Senator's Daughter?: Uncovering the Press Coverage that Led to "The Right to Pri-
vacy," 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 35, 55-58.
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press. 65 In the late nineteenth century, critics used the term
"newspaperization" to describe the perceived "tyranny" of the press
"over public men [and] . . . private life." 66 Warren and Brandeis
wrote:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the
idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued
with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the
details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the
daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled
with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the
domestic circle.67
Arguing that it was the function and duty of the common law to
protect against injuries to the person caused by new social circum-
stances, Warren and Brandeis called for a legal "right to privacy."
They proposed a cause of action that would allow victims of unwanted
publicity to sue in tort and recover damages for the emotional and
dignitary harm that came from having one's image or private affairs
displayed in the press.68 At the time, there were no legal remedies
available for such unwanted, truthful publications. The law of libel
dealt only with falsehoods, and it remedied only injuries to reputation,
not to the feelings.
Warren and Brandeis argued that the common law already pro-
tected a person's right to decide if, when, and to what extent his
"thoughts, emotions, and sensations" would be expressed to others. 69
They cited English intellectual property cases in which courts granted
injunctions to stop the unauthorized publication of letters and various
forms of art.70 Warren and Brandeis argued that these decisions
should be seen as protecting the "right of the individual to be let
alone." 71 Pointing to a general trend in the law toward protection of
human emotions, not merely property and the body, they described
the right to privacy not as a proprietary right, but a spiritual interest
rooted in "personality." 7 2
65. See Glancy, supra note 27, at 25-27.
66. Id. at 11-12 (quoting JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRAT 183 (Pen-
guin Books 1969) (first published 1838)); see also Cond6 Benoist Pallen, Newspaperism, LIPPIN-
COTT'S MONTHLY MAG., Nov. 1886, at 470, 475 ("This tyranny is fast growing intolerable, its
chains heavier, and its exactions more cruel.. . . Through the newspaper no man's private life is
sacred, and least of all that of a public man.").
67. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196, 214.
68. See id. at 205.
69. Id. at 195.
70. Id. at 198-99.
71. Id. at 205.
72. Id.
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The Right to Privacy was widely read, and it generated much praise
and sympathetic commentary.73 Following the article's publication,
several cases were brought in state courts claiming a cause of action
for invasion of privacy. In some states, a common law right to privacy
was recognized.74 In others, including New York, a right to privacy
was created by statute.75 In 1905, the Georgia Supreme Court became
the first court of last resort to recognize the privacy tort with its deci-
sion in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. The photo of an
artist, Pavesich, appeared in an insurance company's advertisement
published in the Atlanta Constitution.76 Pavesich posed for the photo
but did not authorize its use in the ad.77 The court held that he had a
cause of action for invasion of privacy.78 His picture thrust before the
public gaze, Pavesich lost the ability to control his public image-"to
exhibit himself to the public at all proper times, in all proper places,
and in a proper manner" and "to withdraw from the public gaze at
such times as [he] may see fit."79 As a private citizen, not a public
figure, Pavesich had not "waived" his right to privacy.80
In contrast to modern privacy law, in which the operative distinc-
tion between actionable and nonactionable material is whether or not
it is a matter of public concern or "newsworthy," the key distinction in
the early privacy cases was whether or not the subject of the disclosure
was a public figure. In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis
created an exception for press accounts of "public men." The quintes-
sential public men or public figures of the time were public officials,
politicians, leaders of industry, inventors, and "teacher[s], preacher[s],
or professor[s] in science or art.""' It was said that public figures "vol-
untarily injected" themselves into public affairs, and therefore publi-
cations should not be liable for printing a limited amount of private
information about them because they renounced part, though not all,
of their right "to live their lives screened from public observation."8 2
73. See LANE, supra note 26, at 63; Bratman, supra note 7, at 646-50.
74. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 71 (Ga. 1905); Pritchett v. Bd. of
Comm'rs of Knox Cnty., 85 N.E. 32, 35 (Ind. App. 1908); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W.
364, 366 (Ky. 1909), aff'd, 127 S.W. 476 (Ky. 1910).
75. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAw § 50 (McKinney 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-401 to -402
(LexisNexis 1953 & repl. vol. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1950 & repl. vol. 2007) (current
penal provision at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-216.1); see also PEMBER, supra note 38, at 75-76 (dis-
cussing the statutory histories of New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Virginia's privacy statutes).
76. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 68-69.
77. Id. at 69.
78. Id. at 70-71.
79. Id. at 70.
80. Id. at 79.
81. See John Gilmer Speed, The Right of Privacy, 163 N. AM. REV. 64, 73-74 (1896).
82. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 215.
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A degree of public scrutiny was the tradeoff for the honor, recogni-
tion, and power that came with a prominent public position. On this
theory, a federal district court, in Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., denied
an injunction sought by a woman against the publication of an illus-
trated biography of her husband, who had been a famous inventor. 83
Mrs. Corliss argued that her husband was not a public figure.84 The
court disagreed, noting that "[a] statesman, author, artist, or inventor,
who asks for and desires public recognition, may be said to have sur-
rendered [his right of privacy] to the public."85
But the public figure's waiver of privacy did not warrant unlimited
forays into his personal life. Legal commentators of the time argued
that there was an inviolable zone of privacy, a domain of intimate life,
that belonged to every person regardless of his public status.86 Ac-
cording to Warren and Brandeis, only information about the public
figure's private life that was directly related to his public activities was
appropriate for public consumption.87 In contrast to the modern era,
when a good deal of private conduct would be regarded as bearing on
one's public deeds, turn-of-the-century America perceived a distinc-
tion between "the public side or public relation of a public man" and
"his whole personality."8 8 A politician's romantic affairs or his home
life would be among those activities which, in Warren and Brandeis's
words, "have no legitimate connection with his fitness for a public of-
fice." 89 As a writer for the legal journal The Green Bag argued in
1903, even the President "ought to have the right to go home from the
show and be protected from all public molestation by portraiture as he
rides hobby horse with his son, plays bear with his children on his
knees or rolls over the floor with the baby." 90
Unauthorized uses of a public figure's name and image in advertise-
ments would thus be actionable as invasions of privacy because the
83. 64 F. 280 (D. Mass. 1894).
84. Id. at 281-82.
85. Id. at 282; see also Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787, 788 (Sup. Ct. 1891) ("The moment
one voluntarily places himself before the public, either in accepting public office, or in becoming
a candidate for office, or as an artist or literary man, he surrenders his right to privacy . . . , and
obviously cannot complain of any fair or reasonable description or portraiture of himself."),
aff'd, 19 N.Y.S. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
86. See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 216 ("Some things all men alike are entitled
to keep from popular curiosity, whether in public life or not . . . ."); Invasion of Privacy by
Photographers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1902, at 14 ("[E]very individual in private life is entitled to
legal protection against undesired publicity .....
87. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 216.
88. See The Right of Privacy, 12 VA. L. REG. 91, 97 (1906).
89. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 216.
90. W. Archibald McClean, The Right of Privacy, 15 GREEN BAG 494, 496 (1903).
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ads had "no legitimate relation to or bearing upon any act done by
him in a public or quasi public capacity." 91 Moreover, in an era before
the advent of celebrity culture, which gave prestige to the commercial
exploitation of the persona, commercial uses of one's personality and
image were often described as a form of human commodification-
"slavery," as the Pavesich court put it.92 Courts generally did not ac-
knowledge a property right in one's name and image,93 but did recog-
nize unauthorized commercial uses of the persona as a dignitary harm.
The subject was injured by having her picture and personality associ-
ated with a product she did not endorse and put into what was consid-
ered a cheap and undignified commercial context.94 In a 1909 case,
Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held the
unauthorized use of a Senator's name in an advertisement to be an
invasion of privacy.95 While the press might have a right to publish
the pictures of prominent public men in the context of the news, there
was no right to use their pictures to advertise goods.96
In contrast to public figures, the "individual of a purely private
character, who ha[d] in no way dedicated [himself] to the public," did
not waive his right to privacy and "ought ... to be let alone in so much
of his life as is his own private concern." 97 Private citizens were peo-
ple "who [did] not hold office, who [did] not seek office,. . . and who
[did] not engage[] in occupations that bring them conspicuously into
view." 98 They shunned "the public gaze, .. . only moving before the
public at such times and under such circumstances as may be neces-
sary to [their] actual existence." 99 The community had no legitimate
concern with their affairs; according to Warren and Brandeis, the
91. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 216
92. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905).
93. See George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persona as Property, 51 LA. L.
REv. 443, 459 (1991); see also id. at 455 ("[C]ommodification of name and likeness had not
advanced sufficiently at the turn of the century for judges to conceive of persona as a 'thing."').
94. See Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of the
Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 214, 221 (1999) (noting
the right to privacy was intended to "create[ ] and maintain[ ] a legally sanctioned space" beyond
the reach of market forces at a time when there was fear about the commodification of everyday
life). Commodification "den[ied] the conditions of individuation necessary to the proper respect
for and development of one's personhood" by rendering the individual a "fungible commodity."
Id. at 216, 219.
95. 120 S.W. 364, 365-66 (Ky. 1909).
96. See Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 80 ("[I]t cannot be that the mere fact that a man aspires to public
office or holds public office subjects him to the humiliation and mortification of having his pic-
ture displayed [in advertising]."); Foster-Milburn Co., 120 S.W. at 366.
97. McClean, supra note 90, at 497.
98. No Such Thing as Private Citizen, CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 27, 1902, at 39.
99. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70.
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point of the law of privacy was "to protect [such] persons . . . from
being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity." 00 As a
New York trial court noted in 1893, "When [individuals] transgress the
law, invoke its aid, or put themselves up as candidates for public favor,
they warrant criticism, and ought not to complain of it; but, where
they are content with the privacy of their homes," they had a right not
to be publicized against their will.101 Even individuals closely con-
nected to public figures, such as their spouses and children, it was ar-
gued, did not surrender their right to privacy by virtue of
association.102 While taking pictures of the President in public was
not offensive, neither news photographers nor "the public ha[d] the
right to snap kodaks at the wife and children of [public figures] the
moment they appear[ed] on the street." 03
Newspapers' increasing attention to the private lives of private citi-
zens had sparked an outcry. In one notorious incident in 1902, a
young woman, whose only claim to fame was that her fianc6 commit-
ted suicide, was publicized in all the major papers. 104 In an 1886 essay
titled Newspaper Espionage, a writer detailed the anguish suffered by
a civic leader when newspapers publicized his daughter's secret mar-
riage.105 These cases, however, were never brought before the law.
Then, as now, potential plaintiffs were often deterred from bringing
100. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 214.
101. Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908, 909-10 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (granting an injunction against a
newspaper that had published the plaintiffs' photos in conjunction with a popularity contest in
which readers voted for their favorite portrait). In Schuyler v. Curtis, where the defendant at-
tempted to erect a statue of a deceased woman philanthropist, the court granted an injunction,
concluding that Mrs. Schuyler was not a "public character." 15 N.Y.S. 787, 788 (Sup. Ct. 1891),
aff'd, 19 N.Y.S. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
102. See Hillman v. Star Publ'g Co., 117 P. 594, 595-96 (Wash. 1911). In Hillman, a newspa-
per was permitted to publish photographs of the daughter of a man who had been arrested for
real estate fraud in conjunction with a story about the crime even though she was not involved in
it. The decision was widely criticized. Wilbur Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L.
REV. 693, 700 (1912).
103. McClean, supra note 90, at 496; see also The Right to Privacy, supra note 61 ("The fami-
lies of prominent men have a right to appear in public places without being made the target of
cameras unless they are willing.").
104. Letter to the Editor, The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1902, at 30.
105. Joseph B. Bishop, Newspaper Espionage, 1 FORUM 529, 535 (1886) ("No newspaper has a
right to publish broadcast a matter which belongs to my hearth-stone. . .. [W]hen I am pros-
trated with grief, it is an outrage upon me as a citizen to have dragged into print a story which I
had kept to myself."). Other intrusions that were criticized at the time "included the publication
of names of people involved in a supposed scandal, the nature of an anticipated lawsuit,.. . the
name of a private guest of a public man, and the details of a marriage proposal by a distinguished
politician." GURSTEIN, supra note 43, at 154.
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privacy suits because doing so would attract further publicity to the
upsetting matter. 1 0 6
Many of the reported privacy cases involving private persons in this
period did not concern news stories but rather the dignitary harms
alleged to be caused by the unauthorized use of photographic por-
traits in various sorts of advertisements. 107 In a few reported cases,
courts held that plaintiffs had a cognizable claim for emotional inju-
ries caused by commercial exploitation of their images.' 08 Even in the
context of news publications, legal commentators argued, publishing
photographs of private figures without consent should be actionable
as an invasion of privacy. "Where . . . the subject is a private charac-
ter, . . . the kodak [should be] forbidden unless it is with permission
given," even if the photographs were taken in a public place. 109
In 1903, in the most famous privacy case of this era, a young woman
sought legal action in New York state court to stop the publication of
her portrait on posters advertising Franklin Mills Flour.110 The court
in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. acknowledged that al-
though Roberson's photograph was flattering, its display in crass com-
mercial settings, such as "stores, warehouses, [and] saloons," would
reasonably subject any modest woman to "mortifying notoriety.""'
Yet the court rejected her claim, stating there was no legal right to
privacy and that without a property right, she had no ground for either
an injunction or damages.112 The court concluded that recognizing a
right to privacy would open the floodgates of litigation and inundate
courts with petty claims."13 The public and legal community con-
demned the Roberson decision.114 The New York Times was inun-
106. See The Right to Privacy, 51 NATION 496, 496 (1890) ("In order to bring his persecutors
to justice, he will have to go through a process which will result in an exposure of his private
affairs tenfold greater than that originally made by the offending article.").
107. See Armstrong, supra note 93, at 459. The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw the
rise of a mass market for consumer goods and the beginning of the widespread use of visual
depictions in advertisements. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 156 (1993) ("Between the end of the Civil
War and 1900, total expenditures on advertising soared, multiplying tenfold . . . .").
108. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80-81 (Ga. 1905); Foster-Milburn
Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364, 366-67 (Ky. 1909), affd, 127 S.W. 476 (Ky. 1910); Kunz v. Allen, 172
P. 532 (Kan. 1918).
109. See McClean, supra note 90, at 496.
110. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 442 (N.Y. 1902).
111. Id. at 442, 450.
112. Id. at 447-48.
113. See id. at 443.
114. Comment, An Actionable Right of Privacy? Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 12
YALE L.J. 35, 37-38 (1902-1903) (noting the Roberson decision "greatly strengthens the claim,
advanced by the sensational press of to-day, of a right to pry into and grossly display before the
public matters of the most private and personal concern"); see also HIxsoN, supra note 22, at 39
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dated by letters to the editor deploring the outcome of the case. In
response, the New York legislature passed a privacy statute making it
both a misdemeanor and a tort to use the name or picture of any per-
son "for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade" without
his written consent.115 The statutory target of trade purposes, reflect-
ing free press concerns, exempted news publications from liability.116
The definition of "news" was narrow. To the elites of the time, for
whom order and rationality were prized, "news" was not sensational
journalism written for the purpose of entertainment, but rather the
sort of straightforward, factual material that appeared in serious and
staid publications such as the New York Times.117 Yellow journalism,
gossip, and human interest stories that focused on personalities and
private lives were not "news" under the New York statute, it was
often argued, but rather an actionable form of trade or commerce.118
Warren and Brandeis had envisioned a similar privilege for publica-
tions of news or "matters of public and general interest" in the com-
mon law privacy action." 9
In response to the excesses of advertisers and the "scandal-loving
press," eight states had recognized a right to privacy by 1910-five at
common law and three by statute.120 At the same time, a few states
explicitly rejected a right to privacy, noting the absence of precedent,
the difficulties in staking the boundaries of the right, and the law's
traditional hesitance to compensate for emotional harms in the ab-
sence of a compensable physical injury.121 As the Roberson court ob-
served, the line between public and private figures was difficult, if not
("The Roberson decision 'excited as much amazement among lawyers and jurists as among the
promiscuous lay public . . . .' (quoting a New York Times editorial)).
115. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 50 (McKinney 2009); see also JNO J. Flynn, Letter to the Edi-
tor, The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1902, at 8.
116. See generally Lawrence Edward Savell, Right of Privacy-Appropriation of a Person's
Name, Portrait, or Picture for Advertising or Trade Purposes Without Prior Written Consent:
History and Scope in New York, 48 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1983).
117. See generally SCHUDSON, supra note 30, at 186-230 (discussing the debate over informa-
tional journalism versus "story journalism" in the 1890s).
118. See Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Publ'g Co., 146 N.Y.S. 999, 1000 (App. Div. 1914); Jeffries
v. N.Y. Evening Journal Publ'g Co., 124 N.Y.S. 780, 780 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
119. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 214.
120. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Pritchett v. Bd. of Comm'rs of
Knox Cnty., 85 N.E. 32 (Ind. App. 1908); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909);
Schulman v. Whitaker, 42 So. 227 (La. 1906); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 67 A. 97 (N.J. 1907). By
statute: New York, 1909, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAw § 50 (Consol. 1909); Utah, 1909, UTAH PENAL
CODE § 8177 (1917); Virginia, 1904, VA. CODE ANN. § 8-650 (West 1904).
121. See Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285, 289 (Mich. 1899); Henry v. Cherry
& Webb, 73 A. 97, 99-109 (R.I. 1909). Virginia rejected a right of privacy in an unreported case.
PEMBER, supra note 38, at 75. These critiques of the right to privacy are summarized in the work
of Herbert Spencer Hadley, the chief scholarly critic of Warren and Brandeis, who argued that
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impossible, to draw. 122 Other judges spoke of the absurdity of a right
to "privacy in public": "You might just as well prevent a man from
taking and using the picture of another man's house or of his horse,
... unless upon consent," noted one critic. 123 Courts and legal schol-
ars also observed the potential conflict between the right of privacy
and the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. 124 In Corliss,
the district court denied the plaintiff an injunction to prevent the pub-
lishing of the inventor's biography, citing freedom of the press.125 The
right to privacy's threat to freedom of speech and press, however, was
not as apparent as it would be in later years. Free speech law was
largely undeveloped, and the existing doctrine was largely deferential
to the state. Although prior restraints were proscribed, subsequent
punishment of speech that had a "bad tendency"-that threatened
public order or offended public morals-was generally seen as a legiti-
mate exercise of the police powers.126 The prevailing position in the
legal academy was that freedom of the press did not prohibit the pri-
vacy action; 127 as the Virginia Law Review noted in 1906, "[T]he con-
stitutional prohibition against passing a law abridging freedom of
speech or of the press was not intended to confer a license, without
any limitation, to override the rights of others," including "the right to
be left alone." 128
C. The Turn-of-the-Century Model of Privacy
At the turn of the twentieth century, courts, critics, and legal aca-
demics introduced, defined, and developed the concept of a legal right
to privacy-as the Columbia Law Review described it, "immunity ...
the law should not recognize a right to privacy, only property rights. See Herbert Spencer Had-
ley, The Right to Privacy, 3 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1894).
122. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902) ("Who can draw a
line of demarcation between public characters and private characters, let that line be as wavering
and irregular as you please?").
123. J. Flynn, supra note 115; see also Hadley, supra note 121, at 11-12 ("When an individual
... walks along the streets in the sight of all ... , he has waived his right to the privacy of his
personality.").
124. See Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70-71; Atkinson, 80 N.W. at 289; Moser v. Press Publ'g Co., 109
N.Y.S. 963, 965-66 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
125. See Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280, 282 (D. Mass. 1894).
126. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 222-23
(2008). The First Amendment was not yet incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the free speech provisions in most state constitutions were written to reflect the "bad ten-
dency" rule. See David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J.
514, 523-25 (1981).
127. See, e.g., Annotation, Injunctions Against Publications Intruding on Privacy, 43 AM. L.
REG. & REV. 134, 139 (1895); McClean, supra note 90, at 497; Comment, An Actionable Right of
Privacy?, supra note 114, at 37-38.
128. Right of Privacy, supra note 88, at 92.
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against the use of one's personality for private gain by others, or to
feed a prurient curiosity."1 29 This turn-of-the-century model of pri-
vacy rested on five essential principles.130 The first was that there was
a discernable distinction between public and private figures, and be-
tween public and private life. There was a clear "division line in each
one's life, over which the public may not step and demand as of right
that which is on the other side.""'3 The second principle was that
mass media publicity was generally unwarranted without consent-
explicit for private figures and implicit in the case of public figures,
who waived some part of their right to privacy in exchange for a
prominent public role and whose activities were often a legitimate
matter of public concern.
Yet everyone-both public figures and ordinary people-retained a
"zone of privacy" that must not be breached under any circumstance.
This was the third principle. The zone of privacy encompassed the
home and such personal matters as one's physical condition, family
affairs, and intense emotions, like shock and grief. The fourth princi-
ple was that the publicity of private lives, particularly of those who
were not public figures, was typically not "news"; it served no redeem-
ing social purpose, but merely fed the public's curiosity. 132 The final
principle was that the display of private facts in the mass media could
inflict serious dignitary and emotional harms to the subject of public-
ity. Exposure in a mass medium subjected a person, in the words of
E.L. Godkin, to "the great pain of believing that everybody he meets
in the street is perfectly familiar with some folly, or misfortune, or
indiscretion, or weakness, which he had previously supposed had
never got beyond his domestic circle."133 These principles appear to
have had substantial public support; there was a "general agreement"
among the public, in the words of one legal scholar, that "the time and
129. Larremore, supra note 102, at 693.
130. Ruth Gavison has described several premises essential to Warren and Brandeis's
argument:
that press behavior and new technologies of acquisition and dissemination of informa-
tion present a new threat to privacy, that privacy is very important to the lives of indi-
viduals and to the well-being of society, that invasions of privacy could occasionally
cause harm and injury as great as those caused by physical or financial loss, that in
some cases invasions of privacy by publication serve no legitimate public interest, and
that the law should be enlisted td deter this kind of behavior in the same way that it is
used to prevent other types of harms.
Gavison, supra note 15, at 439-40.
131. McClean, supra note 90, at 494.
132. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 218.
133. Godkin, supra note 49, at 66.
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place were ripe for the invention of a legal theory for enforcement of
the right to privacy." 134
III. PRIVACY LAW'S FIRST MODERN ERA, 1920-1950
By the 1940s, popular, scholarly, and judicial views on privacy and
its legal protection had become more complex and ambivalent.
Though several states recognized the privacy tort, plaintiffs faced rela-
tively poor odds in cases involving media defendants. A confluence of
cultural forces undermined the possibility of strong legal protection
against unwanted media publicity of one's person and private affairs.
The interwar period saw the rise of consumer culture, the birth of
modern celebrity, the proliferation of the mass media, and American
culture's fierce drive to liberate itself from the moral strictures of
nineteenth-century Victorianism. One result was a new emphasis on
self-expression, emotional release, and the publicity of material once
considered too personal for public view. Voyeuristic and exhibitionist
themes and impulses-peering in on others' lives and putting oneself
on display-began to suffuse the culture. A right to privacy in many
ways conflicted with this movement toward greater exposure.
It was also in tension with new ideas about the social function of the
press. In a nation bound together by the mass media and in the thrall
of celebrity culture, gossip and stories about personalities and private
lives were increasingly regarded not as a social evil but as a benign
form of modern storytelling, the "printed folklore of the factory
age.'"13s In this period, free speech law was also substantially devel-
oped and liberalized; freedom of the press began to be cast in terms of
the public's right to access news and information on a broad range of
"matters of public concern." 136 Courts began to suggest that there
were both social disadvantages and constitutional difficulties with a
right to privacy that would cover the sorts of media publications that
Warren and Brandeis found offensive. The public's "right to know"
would surpass the individual's "right to be let alone."
134. Glancy, supra note 27, at 7. As Benjamin Bratman wrote, "It seems beyond dispute that
at the dawn of the twentieth century, the American legal community and lay public zealously
supported the enactment of legal protection for their privacy." Bratman, supra note 7, at 650.
For a good summary of the articles and letters to the editor in the New York Times supporting a
right to privacy between 1890 and 1910, see id. at 647-50. There were only two articles in legal
journals that expressly opposed the right of privacy. See Hadley, supra note 121; Denis O'Brien,
The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437 (1902). For supportive pieces in the legal press, in
addition to those previously cited, see The Right to Privacy, 6 GREEN BAG 498 (1894), and The
Right to Privacy, 3 GREEN BAG 524 (1891).
135. HUGHES, supra note 32, at 103.
136. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940).
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A. The Modern Culture of Exposure
1. The Ethos of Exposure
In the early twentieth century, the United States experienced a so-
cial upheaval-a "revolution in manners and morals"137-that broke
down the strict barriers between public and private that had charac-
terized nineteenth-century culture.'38 Feminists and so-called sex
radicals had spoken out against the "conspiracy of silence" around sex
and urged the frank discussion of birth control and other intimate
matters.139 Mass consumer culture and the burgeoning advertising in-
dustry celebrated inner desires and impulses. 140 By the 1920s, many
subjects formerly taboo had been woven into the fabric of popular
discourse. The earlier ideal of emotional suppression and self-
disciplined individualism was eclipsed by a new emphasis on self-
fulfillment, emotional freedom, and personal expression.141
This convergence of the intimate and the social led to a new ideal-
ized model of self-presentation. Popular advice manuals no longer
stressed the importance of concealing one's emotions, but rather pub-
licly manifesting one's inner self, one's so-called "personality," by be-
ing open and candid. 142 The personality ideal was driven by the rise of
the movies and the movie star in the early twentieth century. Because
of the cinema's realism, actors appeared natural, authentic, and inti-
mate on the screen. With their apparent ability to charismatically ex-
press their inner selves to a mass audience, motion picture actors
became exemplars of personality, and they were emulated by millions
of fans.143
Personality and the public display of private life became the basis of
modern fame. While nineteenth-century public figures had been
noted for their productive achievements, modern fame more often
celebrated a person's lifestyle, idiosyncrasies, and personal traits.144
137. FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE
NINETEEN-TWENTIEs 88 (1931).
138. See LYNN DUMENIL, THE MODERN TEMPER: AMERICAN CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE
1920s, at 12-13 (1995).
139. See GURSTEIN, supra note 43, at 68-77.
140. See generally STUART EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: ADVERTISING AND THE So-
CIAL ROOTS OF THE CONSUMER CULTURE (1976); JACKSON LEARS, FABLES OF ABUNDANCE: A
CULTURAL HISTORY OF ADVERTISING IN AMERICA (1994); ROLAND MARCHAND, ADVERTISING
THE AMERICAN DREAM: MAKING WAY FOR MODERNITY, 1920-1940 (1985).
141. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CUL-
TURE 35-41 (1990).
142. SUSMAN, supra note 44, at 277.
143. See generally id. at 35-58.
144. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA 59
(1961).
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By 1927, the celebrity pantheon, as reflected in the typical content of
the Sunday issue of the New York Times, included not only movie
stars, but Broadway producers, literary figures, socialites, athletes,
baseball team owners, screenwriters, and chefs, among others. 145
Their notoriety was not only a function of their accomplishments, but
even more, their interesting personalities and private lives.146 As the
New York Times noted in 1920, stars were defined as those who only
had "to confine themselves to one role-that of being themselves."1 47
Exposing aspects of one's inner self and intimate life to public view
was considered a significant and desirable part of constructing a public
identity.
2. The Media of Exposure
This new spirit of self-exposure was enhanced by new industries and
media of exposure. The change in popular, intellectual, and judicial
attitudes toward privacy cannot be understood without reference to
the tremendous expansion of the mass media. Newspaper circulation
increased from 22.4 million copies a day in 1910 to 39.6 million copies
in 1930.148 News and entertainment continued to blur, and human in-
terest journalism gained in popularity. Motion pictures attracted 95
million viewers each week by the end of the 1920s, 149 and radios be-
came a presence in most American homes by the 1930s.15 0 By the
time of the Great Depression, the trend that had so troubled Warren
and Brandeis had become a defining feature of American culture: vast
amounts of newspaper space, dozens of magazine titles, radio broad-
casts, and movie newsreels were devoted to information and stories
about personal lives.
It was not only entertainment stars whose private lives were put on
display. A writer noted in 1920 that people were no longer as inter-
ested in finding out what the President thought about such public is-
sues as taxation as they were in his eating and grooming habits.1 5' If a
person assumed office or "buil[t] a better mousetrap than his neigh-
145. PONCE DE LEON, supra note 34, at 47-48.
146. BOORSTIN, supra note 144, at 65; LEO LOWENTHAL, LITERATURE, POPULAR CULTURE,
AND SOCIETY 118-23 (Pac. Books 1968).
147. Actors and Stars, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1920, at 4.
148. LYN GORMAN & DAVID MCLEAN, MEDIA AND SOCIETY INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 24 (2d
ed. 2009).
149. THE AMERICAN CENTURY: CONSENSUS AND COERCION IN THE PROJECTION OF AMERI-
CAN POWER 255 (David Slater & Peter James Taylor eds., 1999).
150. Tom Lewis, "A Godlike Presence": The Impact of Radio on the 1920s and 1930s, MAG.
HIST., Spring 1992, at 26, 29.
151. Ed Streeter, No Such Word as "Privacy" in the Lexicon of Presidential Candidates,
WASH. PoST, Oct. 24, 1920, at 61.
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bor," noted a writer in 1935, the media "will make newsreels of him
and his wife in beach pajamas, it will discuss his diet and his health,....
it will publicize him, analyze him, photograph him, and make his life
thoroughly miserable by feeding to the palpitant public intimate de-
tails."152 Standard fare in reporting on public figures, by today's stan-
dards, was still relatively innocuous; although marriages and divorces
were reported, sexual affairs were generally off limits.153 More com-
monly, news consisted of what the public figure ate for breakfast and
"whether or not he sleeps in pajamas." 154 These details nonetheless
gave audiences a much-desired feeling of intimacy with the subject
and the thrill of peering in on another's private life.
Personality journalism was also beginning to delve more deeply into
the lives of average citizens. The proverbial man on the street faced
the possibility of finding himself the subject of media attention by vir-
tue of appearing interesting, bizarre, or simply "real." There devel-
oped an extraordinary public fascination with the lives of ordinary
people;' 55 publishers appealed to a mass audience with stories to
which they could relate. As that era's shrewdest observer of the press,
critic Walter Lippmann wrote, "News which does not offer [the] op-
portunity to introduce oneself into the struggle which it depicts cannot
appeal to a wide audience. The audience must participate in the news,
much as it participates in the drama, by personal identification."156
This was the principle behind two of the period's most successful pub-
lishing genres: the tabloid and the confessional magazine. 5 7
152. Newman Levy, The Right to Be Let Alone, 35 AM. MERCURY 190, 197 (1935).
153. See generally SAMANTHA BARBAS, THE FIRST LADY OF HOLLYWOOD: A BIOGRAPHY OF
LOUELLA PARSONS (2005).
154. STUART EWEN, ALL CONSUMING IMAGES: THE POLITICS OF STYLE IN CONTEMPORARY
CULTURE 93 (1988).
155. See Mitchell Dawson, Paul Pry and Privacy, 150 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 385, 385 (1932)
("'A spirit of inquiry' has indeed become the characteristic of the age we live in. The art of
minding other people's business ... has developed into a major industry, thanks to our modern
mechanical equipment.").
156. Randall P. Bezanson, Public Disclosures as News: Injunctive Relief and Newsworthiness
in Privacy Actions Involving the Press, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1061, 1071 (1979) (alteration in original)
(quoting WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 355 (1945)). As Edward Bloustein would
presciently observe many years later:
A news story about a love triangle murder is more satisfying to the public's prying and
prurient instincts ... if the individuals concerned are named and identified. This is true,
curiously enough, even when the people concerned are not well-known or known at all
to the reader, as long as the identification rings true.
EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 84 (1978).
157. See Silas Bent, Journalistic Jazz, 122 NATION 341 (1926) (discussing the tabloid genre).
Tabloids in New York in the 1920s circulated to more than 1.5 million readers. GORMAN &
MCLEAN, supra note 148, at 25.
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In 1890 relatively few publications were equipped with the facilities
and personnel required for reporting and publishing human interest
stories, but thirty years later, virtually all major newspapers offered
expansive feature sections and multiple gossip columns, illustrated
with photographs. 58 Photojournalism began to develop as a genre,
and in newspapers and magazines, the public was inundated with vis-
ual advertising. 159 Celebrity product endorsements, with stars hawk-
ing items of personal consumption, blurred the boundaries between
the public, the intimate, and the commercial.o60 The images-of faces,
bodies, and candid expressions-that Warren and Brandeis had char-
acterized as deeply personal had become part of the public landscape,
appearing on billboards, product packaging, and movie screens.
3. The Necessity of Exposure
For fame-seekers and the star struck, exposure of one's image and
private life to a wide audience had become a fantasy. 161 For every
American, to a certain extent, it had become a "consequence of mod-
ern life." 162 This was an era when the average person was getting used
to both more and less privacy than in the past. Compared to life in the
small towns of the nineteenth century, the modern city dweller had
become accustomed to a substantial amount of isolation. He lived in
close proximity to his neighbors, yet at the same time, he was often a
stranger to them. New communication technologies and the provision
of social services by government institutions made it possible to func-
tion with a relative amount of anonymity, without deep involvement
in, or dependence on, an intimate community. At the same time,
those technologies and institutions enabled-even compelled-one to
publicly expose increasing amounts of information about one's private
life.
The establishment and growth of the administrative state in this pe-
riod depended on large repositories of personal data.1 63 Through the
administration of the income tax, the census, and other surveys of so-
cial and economic conditions, the federal government began to collect
158. See Gerald W. Johnson, Freedom of the Newspaper Press, 200 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 60, 66-67 (1938).
159. See Armstrong, supra note 93, at 458.
160. Charles Eckert, The Carole Lombard in Macy's Window, in MOVIES AND MASS CUL-
TURE 95, 116-17 (John Belton ed., 1996).
161. A study of the aspirations of adolescent girls in 1924 showed that most of them wanted to
be famous. EWEN, supra note 154, at 95.
162. Thomas F. Woodlock, Thinking It Over: Invasion of Privacy Held a Consequence of Mod-
ern Life, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1936, at 2.
163. See No Such Thing as Private Citizen, supra note 98, at 39.
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vast quantities of private information. 164 The new marketing and pub-
lic relations departments of major corporations amassed statistics on
potential customers, and the burgeoning fields of academic social sci-
ence depended on data collection and analysis.165 The use of intelli-
gence, personality, and vocational aptitude tests was becoming routine
among government and private employers. 166 The average person
now had to "pour[] a constantly flowing stream of information about
himself into the record files-birth and marriage records, public-
school records, census data, military records,... public-health records,
... income-tax returns, . . . bank records, . . . telephone records."167 It
was during this time that humorist Irvin S. Cobb coined the phrase,
"No more privacy than a goldfish."1 68
These "invasions of privacy" were regarded with both resentment
and resignation. As one Chicago Tribune writer lamented in 1925, "If
some one sees you in an automobile all he needs is the license number
to find out if you are the owner.. . . He can search the records and see
what real estate you own . . . . and personal taxes you pay." 169 "It
grows increasingly difficult, year by year, for any man to conserve his
privacy without alienating his friends," wrote a contributor to Forum
magazine.170 "We have all become so accessible, by telephone, by tel-
egraph, or by post, that we are at the mercy of almost anyone who
chooses to make a demand upon our time."171 Yet at the same time,
the public widely accepted these incursions into the private sphere as
necessary to communicate, "to help science, and to help society run
efficiently."172 Eliminating the credit bureaus, the tax collectors, and
164. See LANE, supra note 26, at 108-09. As one writer noted in 1939:
[T]he Federal Government last year sent out 135,000,000 questionnaires seeking ex-
haustive data on . . . the personal habits, condition, and conduct of citizens. . . . The
government got intimate glimpses into the private lives of the other half by scanning
the annual income-tax reports . . . . Each state, city, and county relief board . . . has
snooped into tenement squalor to document the misery of millions of the nation's poor
who are on relief.
Berger, supra note 13, at 16.
165. See Robert Benchley, The Questionnaire Craze, CHI. SUNDAY TRIB., Feb. 9, 1930, pt. 7, at
4; Shils, supra note 42, at 298-99.
166. See Shils, supra note 42, at 295-96.
167. Id. at 159: see also David Lawrence, The Lost Right of Privacy, 38 AM. MERCURY 12,
12-13 (1936).
168. Theodore P. Taylor, Privacy, Goldfish and Cinema Queens, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1918, at
111.17. Americans, George Bernard Shaw noted in 1933, "ha[d] no sense of privacy.... There is
no such thing in the country." Preface to JOURNALISM AND THE DEBATE OVER PRIVACY, at vii
(Craig L. LaMay ed., 2003).
169. Robert L. Floyd, Privacy, CHI. SUNDAY TRIB., Sept. 27, 1925, pt. 1, at 8.
170. Robert J. Shores, A Plea for Privacy, 51 FORUM 425, 426-27 (1914).
171. Id. at 427.
172. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 159.
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the survey takers would certainly increase the amount of privacy held
by the average citizen, quipped one writer, but it would leave society
with little else. 173
These were the modern paradoxes of privacy. City living-some-
thing experienced by over half of Americans by the 1930s-in some
ways produced too much closeness, a new sensitivity to privacy, and a
desire to retreat from others. At the same time, the vast and anony-
mous city of strangers created a sense of aloneness, which led to a
desire to know about the intimate lives of others and to connect with
others by selectively putting one's own private affairs out in the open.
Modern urban life, lacking the tight-knit social networks that existed
in small communities, required artificial, centralized mechanisms for
gathering and disseminating information on a large scale. The ubiqui-
tous radio and telephone may have made it difficult to withdraw from
public life, yet without them, communication in a mass society might
well be impossible. The challenge of the age-as it has been ever
since-was to balance these interests and mediate these tensions. It
was against this backdrop that the law of privacy developed.
B. The Law of Privacy and Exposure
Between 1920 and 1950, an increasing number of states recognized
a right to sue over unwanted and embarrassing publicity of one's im-
age or private life. By 1950, over twenty states acknowledged some
version of the privacy tort.174 Despite this, the law was evolving in
ways that disfavored privacy claimants. The earlier views that a public
figure was entitled to keep much of his private activity out of the pa-
pers and that a private citizen should have a strong, if not near-
absolute, right to stay out of the media spotlight were often described
as incompatible with the needs and demands of modern life. So, too,
was the notion of neat divides between public and private life, and the
concept of "privacy in public." In a series of cases beginning in the
1930s, the spirit of the emerging culture of exposure was written into
the law.
Four central assumptions underlay the modern law of privacy, prin-
ciples which were largely antithetical to the earlier position. The first
was that there could not and perhaps should not be a right to privacy
173. No Such Thing as Private Citizen, supra note 98, at 39.
174. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Washington, D.C., and Wisconsin recognized the privacy tort at common law.
New York, Virginia, and Utah recognized the privacy tort by statute. California recognized the
privacy tort under the state constitution. See PEMBER, supra note 38, at 264-66.
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in public places; given journalistic practices and the state of modern
photographic technologies, one assumed the risk of media publicity
whenever she set foot outside the home. The second was that every
person waived much of her right to privacy by doing nothing more
than participating in the ordinary doings of daily life, so long as the
press found those activities "newsworthy." The third principle had to
do with the cultural significance of popular journalism, and why free-
dom of speech demanded its relatively free and unfettered circulation.
The fourth concerned the harms caused by unwanted mass media ex-
posure. Because celebrities had become objects of emulation and fan-
tasy, and because modern living demanded of everyone a certain
degree of self-exposure, it was said that the average person would usu-
ally not be injured by the display of her photo, and even her personal
affairs, before a mass media audience.
1. No Privacy in Public
In Massachusetts in 1934, two robbery victims were photographed
by a newspaper cameraman as they were talking to the police on the
street.175 The photo appeared on the front page of the newspaper. 176
The victims sued the newspaper for invasion of privacy and lost.17 7 In
another case, a lawyer who had helped the police in a murder case was
photographed by a newsreel cameraman when she was sitting in the
front seat of the police car.17 She lost her privacy suit against the film
company.179 No longer did the earlier notion prevail "that the kodak
is forbidden unless it is with permission given." 80 The new rule was
that everyone assumed the risk of being captured on film and publi-
cized in the media whenever in a public space.181 Appearing in a loca-
tion where one could be seen by the naked eye was effectively consent
to being seen by film viewers, magazine consumers, and newspaper
readers.
This position reflected, in part, the advent of photojournalism,
which was a product of technological developments in taking and pub-
lishing photographs. In 1928, Dr. Erich Salomon introduced what was
175. Themo v. New Eng. Newspaper Publ'g Co., 27 N.E.2d 753, 753 (Mass. 1940).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 755.
178. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 178 N.Y.S. 752, 755 (App. Div. 1919).
179. Id.
180. McClean, supra note 90, at 496.
181. This did not apply to the media's exploitation of the persona for advertising purposes,
which was still viewed unsympathetically by the courts, particularly when it involved nonpublic
figures. See, e.g., McNulty v. Press Publ'g Co., 241 N.Y.S. 29 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Semler v. Ultem
Publ'ns, 9 N.Y.S.2d 319 (City Ct. 1938).
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known as the "candid camera," with a fast lens and flash bulb. 182 The
candid camera enabled an aggressive paparazzi, which became notori-
ous for its "hounding, spying, bribing, stealing, [and] camera-
clicking."' 83 This, combined with improved techniques for printing
photographs, birthed the new genre of "pictorial journalism." By the
end of the 1930s, several significant national publications, including
the popular magazines Life and Look, were devoted to reporting the
news through photographs.18 4 Almost all of the nation's approxi-
mately 17,000 movie theaters showed newsreels prior to the feature
film.18 5 As a result of photojournalism and the newsreel, the "picture
[was] more powerful than the word in the society of today."' 86
The "invariable concomitant" of this genre of journalism was the
"invasion of privacy."187 As a writer noted in 1939, no prominent per-
son was safe from the "prying eyes of the candid camera."188 This
comment followed the notorious press coverage of the aviator and
popular hero Charles Lindbergh. In one of the more sordid episodes
of his stalking, reporters followed him and Mrs. Lindbergh on their
honeymoon and for eight hours circled around a boat on which they
were sailing, trying to take a picture. 189 As one journalist commented,
the candid camera allowed the public to see "important personages as
they really were, not as they wanted to be seen," delighting both audi-
ences and editors.190
The danger of being caught on film had become real, not only for
celebrities but for ordinary people as well. In pursuit of material for
human interest stories, journalists and cameramen patrolled the city
seeking interesting material: accidents, crimes, and unusual faces. The
staple of the movie newsreel was the ubiquitous street scene, in which
unsuspecting subjects were photographed, often in close-up, for dis-
182. H. L. Smith, The News Camera on Trial, 98 F. & CENTURY 267, 267 (1937).
183. Leon R. Yankwich, The Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope and Limitations, 27
NOTRE DAME LAw. 499, 525 (1952) (quoting Crosman, Freedom of the Press in 1930, W. PUB-
LISHER, no. 17, 1930, at 7, 17).
184. Berger, supra note 13, at 20.
185. MARGARET FARRAND THORP, AMERICA AT THE MOVIES 20 (1939).
186. Harry Shaw, Pocket and Pictorial Journalism, 243 N. AM. REV. 297, 302 (1937).
187. Silas Bent, The Invasion of Privacy, 224 N. AM. REV. 399, 405 (1927); see also Donald S.
Baldwin, If Your Photograph Were News, 4 NOTRE DAME LAw. 382, 382 (1929) ("As time goes
on we notice an increasing tendancy [sic] on the part of the newspapers of the country to illus-
trate their stories, shady and otherwise, with photographs of the principal characters. This, cou-
pled with the growth of the tabloids, has unloosed upon the populace of our country a great
army of men armed with the latest inventions for taking the photograph of willing or unwilling
subjects, whose battle cry seems to be, 'get your photograph."').
188..Berger, supra note 13, at 16.
189. Mitchell Dawson, Law and the Right of Privacy, 67 AM. MERCURY 397, 398 (1948).
190. Smith, supra note 182, at 269.
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play on the big screen. As the New York Times observed in 1931, "No
longer is it necessary to be spectacular . . . in order to face the camera.
Now the newsreel companies search out their own material, and
youth, going for a stroll in the park, may suddenly find [themselves] as
part of a human interest sequence called 'Under a Lovers' Moon." 91
In theory, one's "home is still his castle," noted one lawyer in 1948.
There, a person "[did not] have to answer the door-bell or telephone;
he can pull down the shades; he can hide like a grub under a stone.
But when he ventures out he is clearly off base and fair game for any
snooper who thinks him 'newsworthy.'"192
Given this state of affairs, courts and commentators often con-
cluded that every person, from the unknown to the celebrity, assumed
the risk of being photographed when in public.193 As the Restatement
(First) of Torts summarized, "One who is not a recluse" could not
avoid being seen by others in connection with "the ordinary incidents
of community life of which he is a part," including "the possibility that
he may be photographed as a part of a street scene."194 It was on this
theory that in 1939, the California Supreme Court held that the hus-
band of a woman who committed suicide by jumping off a building in
downtown Los Angeles had no cause of action against the Los Ange-
les Examiner when the paper published a photo of her body. 195 The
court observed that the woman had waived her right to privacy by
virtue of committing suicide in a public place. 196
She went to a public edifice in the heart of a large city and there
ended her life by plunging from such [a] high building. It would be
difficult to imagine a more public method of self-destruction. . .. It
was her own act which waived any right to keep her picture from
public observation in connection with the news account of her
suicide.197
We can see this "no privacy in public" position as an attempt, albeit
imprecisely, to describe the actual workings of the media in an age of
photojournalism. It also reflected the somewhat ominous sense of
191. Lewis Nichols, Our Sacred Privacy Becomes a Memory, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 11, 1931,
§ 5, at 8.
192. Dawson, supra note 189, at 397.
193. See Smith, supra note 182, at 269-70. But see id. at 270 ("In the spring of 1930, two
photographers of the Chattanooga Times were fined $100 each for taking a picture of a defen-
dant in a trial in Lafayette, Georgia. The conviction was not for contempt of court but on the
theory that 'no newspaper has the right to publish a photograph of anyone without previously
securing the consent of that person."').
194. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. c (1939).
195. Metter v. L.A. Exam'r, 95 P.2d 491, 493-96 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939).
196. Id. at 496.
197. Id.
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media surveillance felt by much of the public at the time; life was
often described as lived "before the spotlight," and "the klieg lights
spare nobody, high or low." 198 The normative rationale for the doc-
trine, as will be discussed, was rooted in concerns with freedom of the
press. It was feared that a right to privacy in public places would exert
an inhibitive effect on publishing, impairing the public's ability to ac-
cess the news through the media of mass communications.
2. The Waiver of Privacy
a. Public Figures
As we have seen, the typical public figure of the Warren and Bran-
deis era had been renowned for his productive, substantive achieve-
ments, 199 and he waived his right to privacy over his personal affairs to
the extent necessary for the public to appraise his public activities.
The culture of that time tended to view public selves and private
selves as separate and distinguishable, so relatively little information
about private life was considered relevant to one's public deeds.
Half a century later, this view had changed. Because modern fame
was often a function of the public's interest in one's personal traits
and lifestyle, the public figure was considered to have waived her right
to privacy over much of her personal life. Her personality and private
affairs were, in many cases, the very basis of her notoriety. To become
a celebrity, particularly an entertainment star, one had to show off her
"inner self," and, as a California appellate court noted in 1931, "There
can be no privacy in that which is already public." 200
The social contract of fame now required a much greater commit-
ment on the part of the public figure. In return for his social position,
he was required to sustain much deeper public and journalistic forays
into his private life. As the Restatement (First) of Torts summarized,
"he must necessarily pay the price of even unwelcome publicity
through reports upon his private life and photographic reproductions
of himself and his family, unless these are defamatory." 201 Courts de-
scribed the celebrity as having dedicated her life, including her private
life, to the public. Her personal affairs were "public property." 202
Public figures' "biographies [could] be written, and their life histories
198. The Passing of Privacy, WASH. POST, June 30, 1936, at 8.
199. As historian Daniel Boorstin observed, to become famous one "had to be something of a
hero; ... admired for his courage, nobility, or exploits." BOORSTIN, supra note 144, at 46 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
200. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
201. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. c (1939).
202. Martin v. New Metro. Fiction, Inc., 248 N.Y.S. 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
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and their characters set forth before the world in unflattering detail"
without invading their privacy. 203
The most famous iteration of this position was Sidis v. F-R Publish-
ing Corp. in 1940. The Second Circuit held that William James Sidis, a
former child prodigy, had waived his right to privacy over embarrass-
ing personal information published in The New Yorker.204 In the early
twentieth century, Sidis's feats of genius, including teaching math at
Harvard University at age eleven, had been widely publicized in the
press. 205 In 1937, when Sidis was thirty-nine years old, The New
Yorker published a "where are they now" article on him, which de-
scribed in detail his life in a shabby one-room apartment and his odd
habits, including his obsession with streetcar transfers and an obscure
Indian tribe.206 Sidis sued the publisher of The New Yorker for inva-
sion of privacy.207 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York dismissed the privacy count, and the Second Circuit
affirmed.20 8
The Second Circuit admitted that the article was "merciless in its
dissection" of the details of Sidis's private life; however, Sidis's privacy
had not been invaded.209 Sidis had willingly opened himself up to me-
dia attention as a child prodigy and thus waived his right to privacy
over not only information about his public accomplishments, but vir-
tually any personal matters that interested the public. 210 Sidis had
dedicated his life to the public, and when he attracted media attention
for his childhood feats, his life became the possession of the people.
The public figure's alleged waiver of privacy extended not only to
informational publications, but also, in some cases, to advertising.
Though commercial uses of personal images were no longer stigma-
tized-being a celebrity endorser or professional model had become
quite prestigious-there was not yet a right of publicity, a property
right in the commercial value of one's personality.211 Public figures
whose names and images had been appropriated for commercial uses
often sued under the right of privacy and had to claim dignitary harm
203. Prosser, supra note 8, at 417 (footnote omitted); see also Jeffries v. N.Y. Evening Journal
Publ'g Co., 124 N.Y.S. 780 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
204. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
205. Id. at 807.
206. Id.
207. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 34 F. Supp. 19, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), affd, 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1940).
208. Id. at 25.
209. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807, 809.
210. Id. at 809.
211. See generally Armstrong, supra note 93.
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even though their true grievance may have been pecuniary. In a shift
from the prevailing position in the earlier period, courts frequently
concluded that public figures could not recover for such injuries be-
cause they had willingly sought or consented to publicity, and that the
circulation of their names and images was the basis of their fame. In
Martin v. F.I. Y. Theater Co., the plaintiff was a respected film actress
whose picture was displayed in an advertisement on the front of a
local burlesque house without her consent.212 The court sustained the
defendant's motion to dismiss, noting that "any person following the
theatrical business for a life's work has no such right of privacy." 213
Actors could not claim a right of privacy "because their productions,
faces and names are sold to the public." 214
b. Matters of "Public Interest"
The first principle of human interest journalism was that reality was
more interesting than fiction. To this end, publishers routinely
vaunted ordinary people before the spotlight, often against their will.
The personal stories and pictures of average citizens were routinely
paraded before the public in dramatic stories announced with scream-
ing headlines. 215 As one critic noted, "If fate brings [one] tragedy,
pain or even extraordinary luck, his private life will surely be served
up hot and steaming . . . ."216 The papers were filled with human in-
terest stories about persons whose connection to important matters
was "of the slightest." 217
In this environment, where ordinary people could become over-
night celebrities, the line between public and private figures had
blurred. Recognizing the difficulty of distinguishing between the
two-and that fame had become "a mysterious thing [that] frequently
concentrates most heavily on those least deserving of attention" 21 8-
courts adopted a purely descriptive definition of the public figure: a
212. 10 Ohio Op. 338, 339 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1938).
213. Id. at 340 ("Persons who expose themselves to public view for hire cannot expect to have
the same privacy as the meek, plodding stay-at-home citizen."). "[The right of privacy] does not
exist . . . where the person has become prominent, notorious or well known so that by his very
vocation or conduct he has dedicated his life to some continued contact with the public and
thereby has waived his right to privacy." Id. at 341; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
§ 867 cmt. c (1939).
214. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (W.D. Okla. 1938),
rev'd, 106 F.2d 229, 232 (10th Cir. 1939).
215. See generally NANCY BARR MAVITY, THE MODERN NEWSPAPER 33-36 (1930).
216. Dawson, supra note 189, at 405.
217. See generally id. at 398, 401, 404-05.
218. Louis Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Developments, 39 MicH. L. REV.
526, 540 (1941).
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person who had been publicized. "Thus, . . . criminals, prize fighters,
fan dancers and people who try to set endurance records" were con-
sidered public figures,219 as were ordinary people who happened to
get their names or pictures in the press. Like traditional public
figures-those who had actively sought a public career-the involun-
tary celebrity or "instant celebrity" was said to have waived much of
her right of privacy over her image and personal affairs. Where the
press had "thrust upon [a person], public notoriety, he relinquishes
the right to live . . . free from public scrutiny." 220 To retain the fiction
of a consensual waiver of rights, courts suggested that one assumed
the risk of publicity by participating in a society with a mass media
fascinated with the "real lives" of ordinary people. Every person as-
sumed the risk of publicity by doing nothing more than conducting
normal daily activities so long as the press or the public found them
interesting.221
Many privacy cases in this period were brought by instant celebri-
ties in connection with crime reporting. In the 1920s, the press-both
the tabloids and the mainstream papers-became notorious for sensa-
tional crime stories. Crime stories, of course, were nothing new.
What was different about the modern coverage was that whereas the
victim and the criminal had usually monopolized newspaper attention
in the past, the spotlight was now "sure to be turned upon all impor-
tant witnesses and [extended] to persons only remotely connected
with the crime." 222 In several instances, these figures were held by
courts to have waived their right to keep out of the news. In 1929, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that a woman who witnessed her
husband's killing on the street had no cause of action against the local
paper for publishing a picture of her.223 The woman argued that be-
cause she was not a "public figure," having never sought the spotlight,
she had a right to live an unpublicized life. 2 2 4 The court held that
when she went out on the street, she assumed the risk of becoming
involved in an event of "public interest" and, consequently, the risk of
publicity. 225
219. Id. at 540-41.
220. Smith v. NBC, 292 P.2d 600, 603 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
221. "The preponderance of authority .. . seems to sustain the view that . .. a person who . . ,
whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest" has
waived his right to privacy. Martin v. Dorton, 50 So. 2d 391, 393 (Miss. 1951).
222. Johnson, supra note 158, at 67. "[W]itnesses are pilloried as liars and scoundrels, and the
close relatives of the defendants suffer an odium which they can never quite live down." Daw-
son, supra note 155, at 386.
223. Jones v. Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972, 973 (Ky. 1929).
224. Id.
225. Id.
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One also waived one's right to keep one's name or image out of the
media by participating in ordinary activities, such as exercise classes or
working as a waitress, so long as they aroused public interest.2 2 6 In a
1936 case involving unauthorized newsreel footage taken of a woman
in an exercise course for overweight women, the district court de-
scribed the footage as newsworthy and a matter of public interest. 2 2 7
The plaintiff assumed the risk of publicity by taking part in an activity
that amused and titillated the public, if not attracted its legitimate in-
terest. The court concluded:
While it may be difficult in some instances to find the point at which
the public interest ends, it seems reasonably clear that pictures of a
group of corpulent women attempting to reduce with the aid of
some rather novel and unique apparatus do not cross the border-
line, at least so long as a large proportion of the female sex contin-
ues its present concern about any increase in poundage. 228
In Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., the court rejected a pri-
vacy claim against a newspaper that had written about a man's family
and marital life and published a picture of him taken during his child
custody proceeding. 229 When he filed for custody, he waived his right
to live a "quiet peaceful life free from the prying curiosity and unmiti-
gated gossip which accompanies fame, notoriety and scandal" and had
become "a quasi-public figure in the community." 230 As was the case
with traditional public figures, the private lives of these instant or in-
voluntary public figures were described as the possession of the pub-
lic. As a New York appellate court explained, "Even private social
affairs and prevailing fashions involving individuals who make no bid
for publicity are, by custom, regarded as public property ....
Given prevailing journalistic practices, it might have been true as a
descriptive matter that participating in public life exposed one to the
possibility of being publicized against one's will.2 3 2 A more substan-
tive, normative rationale for this position was contained in the "mat-
ters of public interest" or "newsworthiness" privilege. The
226. See Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1936) (woman participating
in an exercise class); Middleton v. News Syndicate Co., 295 N.Y.S. 120 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (woman
portrayed as a waitress, even though she was a model); see also WALTER A. STEIGLEMAN, THE
NEWSPAPERMAN AND THE LAW 228 (1950) ("A hermit is entitled to his seclusion, but even he
has no legal complaint if people think his peculiar way of life is of sufficient interest for a feature
article.").
227. Sweenek, 16 F. Supp. at 747-48.
228. Id.
229. 79 F. Supp. 957, 957-58, 963 (D. Minn. 1948).
230. Id. at 961 (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. Martin v. New Metro. Fiction, Inc., 248 N.Y.S. 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
232. See Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 79-80 (Ga. 1905).
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newsworthiness privilege, which was developed during this period, ap-
plied an emerging civil libertarian free speech jurisprudence to the
tort privacy context. Under this view, a right to privacy that imposed
liability for the publication of truthful matters of public interest would
create unreasonable and potentially unconstitutional restrictions on
the press. The individual's interest in privacy must yield to the greater
good served by the circulation of the "news."
3. Newsworthiness
The newsworthiness privilege immunized media defendants from
invasion of privacy claims if a court found the publicized material to
be "newsworthy" or a "matter of public interest."233 We have seen
the origins of the "public interest" exemption in the Warren and Bran-
deis article and in the New York privacy statute of 1903, which limited
liability to "trade"-defined as "non-newsworthy"-publications.
Rejecting the relatively narrow definition of the news held by Warren
and Brandeis and other privacy advocates of their time, courts now
defined newsworthy material and matters of public interest expan-
sively. Articles and photos that were titillating, bizarre, provocative,
or simply amusing, and that were not wholly fictionalized, were con-
sidered newsworthy as long as they did not completely offend public
sensibilities.234 As a federal district court observed in a 1936 privacy
case, news includes all events and occurrences which "have that inde-
finable quality of interest, which attracts public attention." 235 The fact
that material appeared in a publication that had a paying audience-
any publication, from The New Yorker to True Detective Stories-
appeared to satisfy courts that the matter was one of legitimate public
interest and that it was not offensive.
Newsworthy publications included items that were "neither strictly
news items nor strictly fictional in character." 236 "Such subjects as
cartoons, Believe-it-or-Not Ripley, gossip and social columns, are ...
not likely to be actionable if the facts stated are true and if the com-
ment is fair." 237 Newsworthy material was not limited to newspa-
233. See Nizer, supra note 218, at 540-47.
234. A publication containing false or exaggerated elements was only considered to be non-
newsworthy when it rose to the level of complete fictionalization. See D'Altomonte v. N.Y.
Herald Co., 139 N.Y.S. 200, 202-03 (App. Div. 1913).
235. Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1936) (quoting Associated
Press v. Int'l News Serv., 245 F. 244, 248 (2d Cir. 1917) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
236. Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 295 N.Y.S. 382, 389 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
237. Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, Inc., 98 N.Y.S.2d 119, 123 (App. Div. 1950).
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pers-it could also appear in newsreels, magazines, and books 238 -
and it encompassed more than just current events. In a case from
1949, a former professional boxer who went under the name Canvas-
back Cohen had retired from the ring, but ten years later, Groucho
Marx mentioned his name in a radio broadcast, and Cohen sued for
invasion of privacy. 239 The court held that no matter how much he
wished to retreat from the public eye, he could not "draw himself like
a snail into his shell" and retreat from public view "at his will and
whim" because he still piqued the public's interest.240
What is striking when compared to the earlier period is the defer-
ence to the press on the newsworthiness issue. Under the earlier
model, the scope of newsworthiness was determined by the extent of
the individual's waiver of privacy-information that an individual did
not waive was generally not considered to be newsworthy. By the
1940s, the extent of one's waiver of privacy was determined by the
scope of newsworthiness. One surrendered her right to privacy to
whatever extent publishers felt was necessary to report the news. Un-
derlying the expansive newsworthiness concept were new visions of
the relationship between the press and its audiences, the meaning of
"freedom of the press," the social value of the news media, and why
the imperatives of participatory democracy demanded an expansive
definition of what was fit to print.
a. The Public's Right to Know
In the earlier period, courts and commentators had been conscious
of the potential conflict between the right of privacy and the freedoms
of speech and press. Yet under the dominant approach to freedom of
speech at that time, courts upheld restrictions on speech and publish-
ing if the material was seen as having a "bad tendency"-a propensity
to undermine public order and morals. Defamations and invasions of
privacy were described as immoral and thus could be repressed with-
out constitutional difficulty. In the words of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, "[T]he freedom of the press, guaranteed by [the]
Constitution, is not a freedom to violate the rights of others," and it
did not warrant an invasion of privacy any more than it permitted
defaming a person.241
238. See Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 178 N.Y.S. 752, 755 (App. Div. 1919); Kline v.
Robert M. McBride & Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 674, 682-83 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
239. Cohen v. Marx, 211 P.2d 320, 321 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
240. Id. at 321.
241. BENT, supra note 28, at 70.
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The "bad tendency" doctrine legitimized what would now be con-
sidered unconstitutional content-based restrictions on publishing. In
the early twentieth century, over a dozen states had laws that crimi-
nally punished the printing, publishing, and selling of publications
containing "criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal
deeds, or pictures, or stories or deeds of bloodshed, lust, or crime." 242
Various forms of literary censorship existed, and social reform groups
advocated further restrictions, including the creation of a national
board of censorship for magazines. 243 There were campaigns in sev-
eral states calling for more stringent defamation laws. 2 4 4 Both to stay
clear of existing laws and to stave off the passage of more severe mea-
sures, publishers exercised substantial self-censorship. 245
It was not until the 1930s that the Supreme Court effectively abol-
ished the bad tendency doctrine and began to develop what has re-
mained the modern civil libertarian approach to freedom of
expression.246 In Near v. Minnesota, from 1931, the Court struck
down as unconstitutional a Minnesota law enjoining "malicious, scan-
dalous and defamatory" publications.247 In Near and subsequent deci-
sions in the 1930s, the Court indicated that it would view restrictions
on publishing with heightened scrutiny because of the significance of
free speech and a free press to the democratic process. The public
needed a "vigilant and courageous press" to expose the abuses of cor-
rupt governments and "unfaithful officials." 248 Because free expres-
sion was essential to participatory democracy, freedom of speech
occupied a "preferred position" in the scheme of constitutional liber-
ties, and state actions restricting speech could not stand unless justi-
242. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520-23 & n.2 (1948).
243. PAUL S. BOYER, PURITY IN PRINT.: BOOK CENSORSHIP IN AMERICA FROM THE GILDED
AGE TO THE COMPUTER AGE 160-61 (2d ed. 2002).
244. NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF
THE LAW OF LIBEL 214 (1986).
245. See ROSENBERG, supra note 244, at 225-26.
246. This was presaged by earlier state and federal court decisions involving alleged libels and
violations of espionage and sedition laws, which had offered a more capacious view of freedom
of the press. See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 289 (Kan. 1908) (libel); Star Co. v.
Brush, 170 N.Y.S. 987, 992 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (striking down a local law that forbade the selling of
papers that had criticized American involvement in the war and stating that if the law were
upheld, "[o]ur greatest newspapers and other organs of information and discussion would be at
the mercy of little groups of local officials here and there"); Dearborn Publ'g Co. v. Fitzgerald,
271 F. 479, 485-86 (N.D. Ohio 1921) (enjoining the publication of "obscene or scandalous"
newspapers would be an assault on freedom of speech).
247. 283 U.S. 697, 700, 722-23 (1931).
248. Id. at 719-20; see also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 269 (1941); Grosjean v. Am.
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936).
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fied by a compelling government interest beyond mere disagreement
with the views espoused.249
Freedom of the press meant not only liberty to publish, but also the
right of the public to have access to information about public affairs.
In Near, the Court noted the importance of the press, even scandalous
newspapers, as a means of generating public discourse around politics
and civic issues.250 In Grosjean v. American Press Co., Justice Suther-
land observed the value of a free press in disseminating news and ena-
bling the public to "unite[ ] for [its] common good" as "members of an
organized society."251 In Thornhill v. Alabama, from 1940, the Court
alluded to a First Amendment right of the public to acquire and dis-
cuss "matters of public concern"-"information and education with
respect to the significant issues of the time." 252
Although "matters of public concern" in Thornhill referred to polit-
ics and public affairs, the Court later held that the First Amendment
also protects material published purely for entertainment. In Winters
v. New York, in 1948, a case involving a "true crime" magazine, the
Court implied that such publications were protected by freedom of
the press. Given the state of popular journalism, with its focus on
gossip and human interest, "[t]he line between the informing and the
entertaining" was "elusive," the majority opinion noted.253 "What is
one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine. Though we can see
nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as
much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of litera-
ture."254 As the Court similarly noted in 1946, in Hannegan v. Es-
quire, Inc.:
Under our system of government there is an accommodation for the
widest varieties of tastes and ideas. What is good literature, what
has educational value, what is refined public information, . . . varies
... from one generation to another.... [A] requirement that litera-
ture or art conform to some norm prescribed by an official smacks
of an ideology foreign to our system.255
The American way was to allow the public to "pick and choose" which
ideas to believe, which values to embrace, which culture to consume.
249. On the "preferred position" theory on the Court in this era, see FELDMAN, supra note
126, at 383-92.
250. 283 U.S. 697, 716-20 (1931).
251. 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936).
252. 310 U.S. 88, 97, 102 (1940).
253. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
254. Id.
255. 327 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1946) (footnote omitted).
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Material that seemed to one person "to be trash may have for others
fleeting or even enduring values."256
The newsworthiness concept embodied these antipaternalism, anti-
censorship principles. 257 Beginning in the 1930s, courts framed the
newsworthiness privilege in First Amendment terms as a safeguard of
freedom of the press and the right of the public to access the news,
broadly defined. A right of privacy that "cover[ed] news items and
articles of general public interest, educational and informative in char-
acter," implicated the rights of a "free press," a New York trial court
noted in the 1937 case Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc. 2 5 8
[I]n the case of a person who commits some act of great notoriety,
or who, whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence
of public or general interest, the point is often reached where the
freedom of the press and the right of the public to obtain the infor-
mation becomes dominant over the individual's desire for
privacy.259
b. The Press Represents the Public's Interest
The newsworthiness privilege operated on an assumption about the
relationship between the press and its audiences-that publishers
served the "public's interest." The belief that the press represented
the "public," rather than the interests of officials or elites, was a re-
flection, in part, of the class-driven conflicts over popular media at the
time.260 The 1930s saw campaigns for literary and press censorship led
by elite social reform groups; there was also widespread popular resis-
tance to these efforts.261 Especially in light of book burnings and cen-
sorship of the press in fascist Europe, an unfettered right to see and
read was celebrated as the American way, protected by the Constitu-
tion.2 62 The broad newsworthiness concept reflected these move-
256. Id. at 158.
257. On the "antipaternalism principle," see Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in
the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579 (2004); Daniel Farber, Free Speech Without
Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557-58 (1991); Geof-
frey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189,
212-13 (1983).
258. 295 N.Y.S. 382, 388 (Sup. Ct. 1937); see also People v. Robert R. McBride & Co., 288
N.Y.S. 501, 509 (Magis. Ct. 1936) ("To give to section 50 [of the N.Y. privacy statute] the con-
struction contended for by the complainant would necessarily impute to the Legislature an intent
in its enactment to restrain or abridge the liberty of the press."); Nizer, supra note 218, at 540.
259. Martin v. Dorton, 50 So. 2d 391, 393 (Miss. 1951); see also Molony v. Boy Comics, 98
N.Y.S.2d 119, 122-23 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
260. See SCHUDSON, supra note 30; TEEL, supra note 39, at 7.
261. See BOYER, supra note 243, at 211, 254-69.
262. See Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth
of the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 77 (2000).
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ments for free expression and the growing public sentiment that
content-based "morals regulations" on the media did not express the
values and interests of the mass populace and were thus
undemocratic. 263
Courts noted that editors and publishers, whose concerns with
profit required them to keep abreast of popular preferences, were bet-
ter suited than judges and legislatures to assess the public's genuine
interests and informational needs. A federal district court in 1948 ob-
served that given the zest with which gossip publications were con-
sumed, it should be assumed that publishers' focus on private lives
"merely cater[ed] to the present mores of the people." 264 Since the
time of the Warren and Brandeis article "we have gone much further
. . . in attaching importance in the news to trivial things and sheer
gossip regarding the intimate details of the lives of important and
near-important people." 2 6 5 Even though judges may have found some
of the material to be offensive, it was not their place to impair the
public's reading habits or to pass judgment on its tastes. "Legal ac-
tions for invasion of the right of privacy must not be a vehicle for the
establishment of a judicial censorship of the press." 2 6 6
c. The Public's Need to Know
In reality, courts did judge the content of popular media in ways
that were often favorable. In a 1940 privacy case, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court wrote that most of what appeared in the press was
benign or, at worst, "silly." 26 7 As the Sidis court explained it, gossip
and human interest journalism had a legitimate purpose; it addressed
the public's rightful interest in "the misfortunes and frailties of neigh-
bors and 'public figures.'" 2 6 8
In the interwar period critics and academics began to discuss
and theorize the social functions of the popular media, and the
newsworthiness concept bore the influence of this dialogue. Public
access to a wide range of information through the mass media was
being described as a prerequisite for democratic citizenship,2 6 9 and
mass communications, including popular news and entertainment
journalism, were said to be crucial to the processes of acculturation
263. See BOYER, supra note 243.
264. Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 962 (D. Minn. 1948).
265. Id.
266. See Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 154 A.2d 422, 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959).
267. Themo v. New Eng. Newspaper Publ'g Co., 27 N.E.2d 753, 754 (Mass. 1940).
268. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
269. See COMM'N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 14 (1947).
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and socialization. 270 By providing a diverse public with shared inter-
ests and knowledge, by reinforcing common values, and by sparking
discussion and debate over social practices and issues, popular jour-
nalism could serve as the modern equivalent of back-fence gossip and
as the "printed folklore of the factory age." 271
"As I looked at this afternoon's paper it struck me as being remark-
ably nosey," noted the author of a 1934 article titled A Use for Human
Interest Stories.272 The details about average people that appeared in
its pages were "just out of ordinary . . . curiosity. Small-town stuff.
Neighborhood gossip." 2 7 3 If one lived in a small town, "[t]he stuff the
newspaper prints would have been superficial to you, for you would
have known so much more about [the subjects] that was so much
more intimate." 274 "The human interest article . .. gives something of
that intimacy. . . . It satisfies our insatiable desire to peek and pry, and
to be peeked and pried at." 2 7 5 In 1940, communications theorist
Helen MacGill Hughes observed that newspaper stories about person-
alities and private lives permitted the "sort of intercourse that people
formerly carried on at the crossroad stores or back fences" and cre-
ated the "conditions of close communication whose absence denies
the city the social cohesion that the village possesses." 276 Language in
the Restatement (First) of Torts, published in 1939, also suggested the
sociological similarities between human interest stories and small-
town oral gossip. As the Restatement observed, referring to the press
attention given to those bound up in newsworthy events,
Community custom achieves the same result with reference to one
unjustly charged with crime or the subject of a striking catastrophe.
Both groups of persons are the objects of legitimate public interest
during a period of time after their conduct or misfortune has
brought them to the public attention; until they have reverted to the
lawful and unexciting life led by the great bulk of the community,
270. See JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 98 (1927); Bernard Berelson, What
"Missing the Newspaper" Means, in MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT
254 (John Durham Peters & Peter Simonson eds., 2004); Robert E. Park, News as a Form of
Knowledge: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge, 45 AM. J. Soc. 669, 679 (1940).
271. HUGHES, supra note 32, at 103 (quoting Silas Bent); see also Zimmerman, supra note 4,
at 333 ("The press, therefore, when it provides information about the private lives of both fa-
mous and ordinary people, could be viewed merely as performing a traditional function that no
longer can be accomplished by person-to-person gossip alone.").
272. William G. Mather, Jr., A Use for Human Interest Stories, 238 N. AM. REV. 543, 543
(1934).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 544.
275. Id.
276. Helen MacGill Hughes, Human Interest Stories and Democracy, PUB. OPINION 0., Apr.
1937, at 73, 78.
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they are subject to the privileges which publishers have to satisfy the
curiosity of the public as to their leaders, heroes, villains and
victims.277
"Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors and
'public figures' are subjects of considerable interest" to the public,
wrote the Sidis court, "[aind when such are the mores of the commu-
nity, it would be unwise for a court to bar their expression in the news-
papers, books, and magazines of the day." 2 7 8
4. The Harms of Exposure
The final assumption underlying the modern position on privacy
had to do with the perceived harms of exposure. As the doctrine had
evolved by 1950, to win a suit for invasion of privacy by public dis-
closure of private material, the disclosure must have been non-
newsworthy and offensive to a reasonable person. 279 As the Restate-
ment summarized, "It is only when the defendant should know that
the plaintiff would be justified in feeling seriously hurt by the conduct
that a cause of action exists."28 0 Sometimes this was phrased in terms
of offense not to the subject, but to the audience; disclosures, as the
Sidis court put it, must not be so intimate and unwarranted "as to
outrage the community's notions of decency." 281
In contrast to the earlier perspective, it was now often assumed that
the reasonable person would not be harmed by most sorts of media
exposure. The right to privacy did not protect the hypersensitive indi-
vidual, and one who was offended by press commentary on one's
"dress, speech, habits, and the ordinary aspects of personality" was
hypersensitive under modern standards. 28 2 According to the Restate-
ment, "[T]here is no invasion of a right of privacy in the description of
the ordinary goings and comings of a person or of weddings, even
though intended to be entirely private .".. ."283 Samuel Warren, with
277. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. c (1939).
278. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
279. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. c (1939) (non-liability for publicity of public
figures and newsworthy events such as a "striking catastrophe"); see also id. § 867 cmt. d
("[L]iability exists only if the defendant's conduct was such that he should have realized that it
would be offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities.").
280. Id. § 867 cmt. d.
281. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
282. Id.
283. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. d (1939).
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his outrage over the publicity of his niece's wedding, was no longer the
reasonable man.2 8 4
This position rested, in part, on the popular belief at the time that
modern life-"[t]he telephone . . ; the radio . . ; the current flood of
questionnaires; the spread and mushroom growth of keyhole journal-
ism; the prying eyes of the candid camera; the newsreel; the traffic in
mailing lists"-had desensitized the public to invasions of privacy, and
that much of the populace had become not only voyeuristic but exhi-
bitionist, both eager to pry into strangers' lives and to show them-
selves off to others. 28 5 When the 1940 census added questions about
income, educational level, and marital status, there were discussions
that this constituted an invasion of privacy. First Lady Eleanor
Roosevelt defended the changes, noting that women no longer
minded discussing "their age, income and whether they have been di-
vorced." 28 6 Commentators noted "the public eagerness to express
opinions and pose for pictures for Inquiring Reporters who roam the
large cities" and "the willingness of people to . . . . surrender . . .
intimate secrets to radio personalities . . . who exploit them on the
air."287 A writer in The Atlantic noted:
The pendulum has swung far since the hyper-reticent days of our
grandmothers. . . . [T]he majority [has] lost all desire for privacy,
either for themselves or for anyone else. They step eagerly into the
range of every newspaper and movie camera, and send in their
names by the thousand to have them announced over the radio.288
Many Americans "crave to be lifted out of the morass of anonym-
ity." 28 9 To them, "[any publicity, even though unfavorable, is better
than none at all." 2 9 0
It was against this backdrop that courts expressed suspicion of
claims of emotional and dignitary harms from media exposure. 291 In a
number of cases, courts concluded that because people had become
used to exposing aspects of their private lives, and because they may
284. As Prosser later wrote, "The ordinary reasonable man does not take offense at mention
in a newspaper of the fact that he has returned from a visit, or gone camping in the woods, or
that he has given a party at his house for his friends . . . ." Prosser, supra note 8, at 397.
285. See Berger, supra note 13, at 16.
286. First Lady Calls Census All Right, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1940, at 14.
287. Berger, supra note 13, at 18.
288. Dawson, supra note 155, at 387.
289. Dawson, supra note 189, at 404.
290. George Ragland, Jr., The Right of Privacy, 17 Ky. L.J. 85, 87 (1929).
291. Yet courts were, in other contexts, becoming more sympathetic to claims of mental dis-
tress without accompanying physical injury. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA
103 (Expanded ed. 2003) (noting that claims for emotional distress began to seem less specula-
tive in the 1920s and 1930s as psychology came to be regarded as a science and emotional dis-
tress regarded as a legitimate illness).
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have even wanted to be publicized, they were unlikely to be seriously
harmed by most sorts of media publicity. Only highly unflattering
publicity of extremely intimate matters would constitute an invasion
of privacy. If the material revealed was not overtly uncomplimentary,
no harm had occurred.292 In Pittsburgh, a woman asked for $10,000
for "humiliation" when her photo was used in a display of beautiful
women in a pharmacy window that she did not approve. 293 The court
awarded one dollar on the grounds that there was no harm because
the display was flattering.294 A 1947 case, Cason v. Baskin, involved a
privacy claim brought by a woman who was described as a colorful but
eccentric spinster in a novel written by a famous author.295 The Su-
preme Court of Florida upheld Cason's claim for invasion of privacy
but directed that she be awarded no damages because the character
sketch portrayed the plaintiff as "a fine and attractive" individual. 296
One enduring legacy of the nineteenth century was privacy's
gendered dimension and the notion that respectable women, naturally
modest and averse to the public gaze, were more emotionally sensitive
and vulnerable to the harms of unwanted public exposure, particularly
when it implicated sexuality or the body. 297 Privacy suits involving
women plaintiffs accounted for a significant number of successful
cases against media defendants. 298 In Melvin v. Reid, from 1931, the
plaintiff was a former prostitute who had been tried for murder and
acquitted, but who had reformed herself, married, and achieved a
place in respectable society. 299 A movie was produced based on the
292. See, e.g., Samuel v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 122 F. Supp. 327, 329 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (concluding
that a picture of a man talking to a woman on the edge of a bridge in an attempt to dissuade her
from committing suicide "would [not] cause the publisher of the picture to have reason to be-
lieve that the picture would offend the sensibilities of a normal person"); see also Gill v. Hearst
Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1953) ("Nor does there appear to be anything 'uncomplimen-
tary' or discreditable in the photograph itself, so that its publication might be objectionable as
going 'beyond the limits of decency' and reasonably indicate defendants' conduct to be such that
they 'should have realized [that] it would be offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities."'
(quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. d (1939))).
293. Woman Wins a $1 Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1942, at 21.
294. Id.
295. Cason v. Baskin, 30 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1947).
296. Id. at 645. For an interesting account of this case, see PATRICIA NASSIF AcTON, INVA-
SION OF PRIVACY: THE CROSS CREEK TRIAL OF MARJORIE KINNAN RAWLINGS (1988).
297. See generally Anita Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 441 (1990).
298. See, e.g., Peay v. Curtis Publ'g Co, 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948); Barber v. Time, Inc.,
159 S.w.2d 291 (Mo. 1942); Sutton v. Hearst Corp., 98 N.Y.S.2d 233 (App. Div. 1950); Blumen-
thal v. Picture Classics, Inc., 257 N.Y.S. 800 (App. Div. 1932); Semler v. Ultem Publ'ns, Inc., 9
N.Y.S.2d 319 (City Ct. 1938).
299. 297 P. 91, 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
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true story of her past life, using her true maiden name.300 She sued
the producer and recovered damages for invasion of privacy on the
theory that publicity of her disreputable sexual past inflicted a deep
affront to her dignity and reputation.301 In the 1942 case of Barber v.
Time, Inc., the publication in Time magazine of an article about a
woman's rare ailment that caused her to lose weight while eating insa-
tiably, together with a picture of her in bed wearing a hospital gown,
was held not to be newsworthy.302 Similarly, courts were more likely
to find publicity offensive or not newsworthy when it involved chil-
dren, who were presumed incapable of assuming the risk of public
exposure and more likely to be harmed by it.303 But in most cases, the
assumption was that very few people truly resented publicity and that
"[o]nly a shy minority is really hurt by the spotlight." 304 Having one's
photo in the paper was not in itself offensive because "[t]he average
person likes to see his picture in a newspaper upon any pretext."305
As one popular writer had put it, in a world where publicity was
highly valued and highly paid, most people are "glad to live in a glass
house" and to wash their dirty linen in public. 3 0 6
C. Privacy Beyond the Law
The foundations of the modern tort law of privacy were developed
primarily between the 1920s and the 1950s, when new technologies for
acquiring and disseminating images and information, the fascination
with celebrity and self-exposure, the proliferation of human interest
and personality journalism, and the theoretical and constitutional jus-
tifications for its circulation produced a set of doctrinal conventions
and fictions that protected what was described as the "right of the
public and the press to discuss personalities." 307 This history explains,
in part, why successful privacy suits against the media are relatively
rare in the United States as compared to European countries. 308 Pri-
vacy law did not develop strongly in America because its evolution
coincided with the emergence of a liberal free press doctrine and a
culture of exposure.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. 159 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Mo. 1942).
303. Leverton v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951); Metzger v. Dell Publ'g Co.,
136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
304. Dawson, supra note 189, at 404.
305. Larremore, supra note 102, at 702.
306. Dawson, supra note 189, at 398.
307. See Themo v. New Eng. Newspaper Publ'g Co., 27 N.E.2d 753 (Mass. 1940).
308. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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This modern position on privacy was attacked by legal commenta-
tors for its apparent disregard of the value of privacy.309 One critique
was the failure to take into account the difference between appearing
"in public," in the sense of being outside one's home, and being dis-
played before a media audience. 310 Deference to the press on the
newsworthiness question was also criticized. Editors were hardly in
touch with the public interest, it was said, and the purpose of gossip
and human interest journalism was merely to sell papers by pandering
to the public's worst tendencies and curiosities.311 Other critics noted
the limitations of the privacy tort as a means of redressing the harms
caused by media exposure of private life. Victims of truly embarrass-
ing publicity were unlikely to go to court because bringing suit would
attract further attention to the matter. 312 The more serious the injury,
the less likely that the victim would care to revisit it by taking legal
action.
Yet it would be wrong to describe the emerging legal position as an
abandonment of privacy. The doctrine was fashioned against a back-
drop of significant extra-legal safeguards against excessive and intru-
sive media exposures-social norms, institutional checks within
journalism and the publishing industry, and the inherent limitations of
existing technologies. As the courts may have recognized, privacy
could exist in practice beyond the relatively narrow protections of-
fered by the law.
The interwar period saw the professionalization of journalism, the
eradication of many of the excesses of yellow journalism, and the for-
mulation of industry-wide codes of ethics.313 The American Society of
Newspaper Editors' code, created in 1923, required that "[a] newspa-
per should not invade private rights or feelings without sure warrant
of public right as distinguished from public curiosity." 314 Much anec-
dotal evidence indicates that this rule was not always followed.315
Many news publications did, however, adopt editing and reporting
practices that restrained more extreme intrusions into private affairs.
309. See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 187; Berger, supra note 13; Dawson, supra note 189.
310. See FRANK THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PREss 501 (1944) (opining that, were a
photo taken of a movie star sunbathing on her deck and published in a newspaper, there would
be a violation of her privacy because "by taking the sunbath in what she considered private
quarters, she did not consent to having her photograph spread across the nation").
311. See generally Dawson, supra note 155.
312. Dawson, supra note 189, at 404.
313. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 21 (Stephen L. Vaughn ed., 2008); John
H. Summers, What Happened to Sex Scandals? Politics and Peccadilloes, Jefferson to Kennedy,
87 J. AM. HIST. 825, 842 (2000).
314. Fame and Privacy, NATION, Aug. 20, 1930, at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted).
315. See generally BENT, supra note 28.
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Some newspapers had "office rule[s] not to print details of local
divorce suits, statutory assaults, and other local stories in court and
out involving the sex question," 316 and a policy of printing news of
divorces and crimes but not the names of the individuals involved.317
Most had a practice of suppressing the names and the photographs of
children connected with crime or criminals, to avoid "the child ...
be[ing] singled out for possible scorn and ridicule."318 As one manag-
ing editor wrote in 1940, "There is one thing that all editors do almost
without exception: they protect the good name of virtuous women and
of young boys of good family." 319 Scenes of funerals and burials were
taboo, and "four letter words related to sex and bodily functions
[were] shunned." 320 The romantic affairs and illnesses of politicians
were often strictly concealed, 321 and the more risqu6 activities of
movie stars were frequently suppressed. 322 Mainstream news outlets
sought to distinguish themselves from the tabloids in their exercise of
restraint, and the New York Times prided itself on being "decently
mum on many a scandal that the hard-eyed New York Daily News
delights to mock and maul." 323
These practices were an attempt, in some sense, to track social
norms. Despite expansive public curiosities, there were still topics,
particularly in more conservative parts of the country, that were seen
as too intimate or personal for public display and discussion. Gerald
Johnson, a commentator on the press and a columnist for the Balti-
more Sun, noted the presence of distinctive "communal mores" in cer-
tain areas-strict taboos on the discussion of sexual matters, for
example, or conventions regarding the portrayal of women.324 De-
spite the growth of national and regional newspaper chains, in many
areas editors were still members of the local community and were
316. KILLING THE MESSENGER: 100 YEARS OF MEDIA CRITICISM 19 (Tom Goldstein ed., rev.
ed. 2007) (quoting the 1911 editorial of journalist William Allen White).
317. Id.
318. STEIGLEMAN, supra note 226, at 231.
319. NEIL MACNEIL, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR 349 (1940); see also THE NEWSPAPER AND
SOCIETY 132 (George L. Bird & Frederic E. Merwin eds., 1942) ("Practically all newspapers
enjoin greater care in dealing with the reputation of women . . . .").
320. CURTIS D. MACDOUGALL, THE PRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS 118 (1964). On one paper's
taboo list were the words nude, naked, rape, gossip, and scandal. See Max Hall, Can a Yellow
Rag Change Its Color?, in REPORTING THE NEWS 166 (1965).
321. See generally Summers, supra note 313. The most famous case is President Roosevelt's
polio. See LANE, supra note 26, at 10.
322. This was often done via agreement with the Hollywood studios. See generally BARBAS,
supra note 153.
323. Not So Private Lives, TIME, Oct. 18, 1948, at 55.
324. See Johnson, supra note 158, at 70-71.
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closely accountable to their readers. 325 As Johnson observed, in many
regions, "the newspaper must conform" with social norms "on pain of
losing circulation and with it the advertising value by which it lives." 326
William Allen White, editor of the Emporia Gazette, wrote that the
paper lost more money than it made when it published the "sickening
details" of a notorious murder trial. 32 7
The strongest check against invasive media exposures of private life
may have been the inherent limitations of existing technologies.
There was limited space in a newspaper or magazine. It required
human effort to take pictures. Even the most persistent paparazzi
could not capture what a video camera, in later years, could record in
an instant. The reach of even the most widely circulated newspapers
and magazines was miniscule compared to what would be achieved by
television and the Internet. Compared to what lay ahead, the technol-
ogy of the pre-World War II era did not allow the law's position on
privacy to become a license for total exposure.
IV. PRIVACY LAW'S SECOND MODERN ERA, 1950-1970
By 1960, a right to privacy existed in the "overwhelming majority of
the American courts." 328 In most states, it constituted a tort to pub-
lish material concerning one's private or personal affairs if the publi-
cation was highly offensive to a reasonable person and the material
was not a matter of public concern, or "newsworthy." 329 As we have
seen, the courts' tendency to defer to the press on the newsworthiness
question led to a balance between privacy and the "public's right to
know" that was heavily weighted toward the latter. The balance
tipped even more sharply in that direction in the two decades after
World War II.
In the postwar era, the courts continued to apply the law in a way
that often precluded recovery against media defendants. At the same
time, transformations in the social, cultural, and technological envi-
ronment increased the likelihood and the potential harms of exposure
in the mass media. Televisions became a presence in most American
homes in the 1950s, and postwar affluence and increased leisure time
vastly increased the audience for news and entertainment media.330
Media coverage of World War II introduced a new frankness and real-
325. STEIGLEMAN, supra note 226, at 231.
326. Johnson, supra note 158, at 70.
327. KILLING THE MESSENGER, supra note 316, at 19.
328. See Prosser, supra note 8, at 386-87.
329. See id. at 396, 412.
330. See VANCE PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY 23 (1964).
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ism into journalism and popular culture, and investigative reporting
became a prominent genre. The postwar era saw the popularity of
new scandal and gossip publications such as Confidential and the Na-
tional Enquirer. Their sensational coverage was aided by new tech-
nologies of surveillance-wiretaps and hidden cameras-that also
owed their origin to the war experience. Rather than increase legal
protections for privacy, these developments, as in the earlier period,
diminished them; the public had become desensitized to exposure, it
was said, or somehow assumed the increased risks of media publicity.
As the focus of the public's privacy anxieties in the Cold War era be-
came the government, rather than the press, and as the Supreme
Court expanded the scope of constitutionally protected speech, the
possibility of unwanted and humiliating mass exposure came to be re-
garded as a necessary casualty of a free marketplace of ideas.
A. The New Old Doctrine
1. Privacy and Celebrity
In the postwar era, furthered by the development and cultural per-
meation of the medium of television, the public's fascination with ce-
lebrity deepened and suffused all areas of social life. To be a celebrity,
as cultural critic Daniel Boorstin noted in 1962, was to be known for
one's personality and private affairs.331 "When we talk or read or
write about celebrities, our emphasis [is] on their marital relations and
sexual habits, on their tastes in smoking, drinking, dress, sports cars,
and interior decoration . . . ."332 Therefore, courts reasoned, the ce-
lebrity assumed the risk of having much of her private life exposed to
the public when she took on a career that would lead to fame. 3 3 3
While the recognition and development of a right of publicity in the
1950s permitted recovery of the economic value of one's personality
when exploited for commercial purposes,334 in the noncommercial or
"news" context, courts construed the celebrity's waiver of privacy to
be expansive. Some courts would limit it at intimate romantic affairs
331. See BOORSTIN, supra note 144, at 65; see also The Mass Media and JFK, 37 CLEARING
HOUSE 443, 443 (1963) ("[Tlhe important names in television [are] people who remain basically
themselves when on camera.").
332. BOORSTIN, supra note 144, at 65.
333. See Prosser, supra note 8, at 411 ("Three reasons are given, more or less indiscriminately,
in the decisions: that they have sought publicity and consented to it, . . . that their personalities
and their affairs already have become public, . . . and that the press has a privilege, guaranteed
by the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of
public interest.").
334. For the origins of the right of publicity, see Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity,
19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 203, 203-06 (1954).
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or highly personal family activities. 335 Others went as far as to suggest
that the waiver was absolute. As a 1953 treatise explained, "As far as
public performers are concerned, the right of privacy is nonexistent or
has long since been waived.... Public performers who are currently in
the public eye are in no position to claim injury to their mental inter-
ests."336 "So highly personal is the interest of the public in 'public
figures' that I doubt it is actionable to publish fair reports of incidents
in a private life not directly related to the qualities or achievements
upon which the status of a public figure depends," noted a federal
district court in Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., which involved a
story about a famous stunt driver.337 In Chaplin v. NBC, from 1953,
Charlie Chaplin sued NBC over news broadcasts that aired a tele-
phone conversation between Chaplin and a radio commentator that
had been obtained by wiretapping.338 Chaplin was said to have
waived his right of privacy over the phone conversation because he
was "a prominent public figure whose activities are of general public
interest."339
The continued growth of the psychological profession and the war-
time popularization of psychological concepts in popular culture340
fueled the notion that a public figure could not be really known or
understood without a searching investigation of his psyche and private
life.3 41 As the vice president and general counsel of Look magazine
put it, "The press . . . has not only the right, but the duty, to publish
facts pertaining to public figures and, in so doing, to examine them to
see what makes them 'tick,' how they stack up on analysis, and what
they are . . . as persons." 342 Before World War II, the press had, to
335. See Irwin o. Spiegel, Public Celebrity v. Scandal Magazine-The Celebrity's Right to Pri-
vacy, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 280, 297, 299 (1957).
336. HARRY P. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION RIGHTS 995-96 (1953); see also Gill v.
Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 447 (Cal. 1953) (Carter, J., dissenting) ("Obviously anything [a
celebrity] may do or say has news or educational value."); Yankwich, supra note 183, at 519 ("It
does not exist where a person has become prominent or distinguished. By such prominence he
has dedicated his life to the public and thereby waived his right to privacy.").
337. Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538, 544 (D. Conn. 1953).
338. Chaplin v. NBC, 15 F.R.D. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
339. Id. at 138.
340. See generally ELLEN HERMAN, THE ROMANCE OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY: POLITICAL
CULTURE IN THE AGE OF EXPERTS (1995).
341. See JEFFREY OLEN, ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 62-64 (1988) (noting that some private af-
fairs of politicians-sexual affairs, psychiatric problems, drinking problems, among others-may
have bearing on public officials' public responsibilities and can be legitimate subjects of media
coverage); see also JOURNALISM ETHICS 223 (Christopher Meyers ed., 2010) ("When private
information is connected to the job performance of a current or potential public official, this
information is certainly relevant and needed.").
342. Sinatra Drops His Libel Suit for $2,300,000, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1957, at 4.
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some extent, concealed the private affairs of public officials as part of
an unwritten agreement in which officials granted reporters access in
return for suppressing potential scandal. 343 Yet journalists were less
likely to follow this agreement in the postwar era, when a nev focus
on investigative journalism encouraged deeper coverage of public offi-
cials' personal lives. 344 The law deferred to this reporting trend. In a
representative case, Kapellas v. Kofman, the California Supreme
Court held that a newspaper article that revealed the various arrests
of the children of a candidate for office did not violate her or her
children's right to privacy. 345 The court concluded, "[a]lthough the
conduct of a candidate's children in many cases may not appear par-
ticularly relevant to his qualifications for office, normally the public
should be permitted to determine the importance or relevance of the
reported facts for itself."346 One who is a public figure is "subjected to
the most thorough scrutiny." 347
2. Privacy in Public
In light of the growth of the paparazzi, live television coverage, and
the increasing presence of cameras in public places,348 courts main-
tained that both famous people and noncelebrities waived their right
to privacy when they appeared in a public place. Rather than increase
the need for legal protection against invasions of privacy, courts held
that the risk of unwanted publicity posed by these technological devel-
opments was to be assumed by the public. In Jacova v. Southern Ra-
dio & Television Co., a television company showed a newscast
depicting a man who had been arrested at a cigar store as part of a
police gambling raid.349 The man, who had stopped at the store to buy
a newspaper, was falsely accused of being a gangster, and the footage
depicted him being shoved up against a wall by the police.350 He al-
leged that he was deeply humiliated by this public display in a false
343. See Summers, supra note 313, at 845-46.
344. See JAMES L. AUCOIN, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM 51
(2005) (tracing the resurgence of investigative journalism to the fallout between the press and
the government in the mid-1950s). Before the 1950s, the mainstream news media did not take
an aggressive stance against the government, Aucoin writes, but Senator Joseph McCarthy's in-
timidation of the press led to a more adversarial relationship and a call for "more in-depth"
reporting on public affairs and public officials. Id.
345. 459 P.2d 912, 924 (Cal. 1969).
346. Id. at 923.
347. Id. at 922.
348. See PACKARD, supra note 330, at 29-43; WESTIN, supra note 16, at 70-73.
349. 83 So. 2d 34, 35-36 (Fla. 1955).
350. Id.
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context.351 The court held that the subject had waived his right to
privacy because the actions took place in public. 352 In the 1954 case
Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., the California Supreme Court rejected
the claim of a couple who had been photographed in an affectionate
pose at their place of business, a ice cream shop in the Farmers' Mar-
ket in Los Angeles, by a news photographer.3 53 They did not know
that the photograph would appear in Harper's Bazaar magazine,
where it was used to illustrate an article about "love at first sight." 354
The court held that the couple waived their right to privacy insofar as
they had "voluntarily" taken the pose in public.3 55 The image thus
became a part of the "public domain . . . as to which they could not
later rescind their waiver in an attempt to assert a right to privacy."
"The photograph did not disclose anything which until then had been
private," the court concluded, "but rather only extended knowledge of
the particular incident to a somewhat larger public than had actually
witnessed it at the time of occurrence."356
Consenting to public exposure in one context was, in other words,
the same as consenting to exposure in almost any medium or context.
Though the widow of a man who had been kicked to death by gang-
sters permitted representatives of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and the
Pittsburgh Press to take pictures of the family, she did not authorize
their use in the pulp magazine Front Page Detective.357 A federal dis-
trict court rejected her claim for invasion of privacy against Front
Page Detective, holding that the family had "voluntarily attached
themselves pictorially to this news item."358 In 1949, the Marine
Corps officer whose life story had been made into the famous
Hollywood war film Sands of Iwo Jima lost his suit for invasion of
privacy against the Republic Film Company. 359 The court held that he
had waived his right to avoid having a film made about him when he
351. Id. at 35.
352. Id. at 40. Time magazine, in 1954, asked, "Does a press photographer have the right to
take a newsworthy picture even when the subject objects?" The answer in a lower Iowa court
was that a "photographer is within his rights so long as he is in a public place. . . .
[P]hotographers on public property may take pictures of anyone they want to, objection or no."
Freedom to Photograph, TIME, Aug. 9. 1954, at 52, 52.
353. 253 P.2d 441, 442-45 (Cal. 1953).
354. Id. at 442.
355. Id. at 444.
356. Id. at 445. But see Gill v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 239 P.2d. 630, 635 (Cal. 1952) (holding that
the publication of the photograph in the context of an article that appeared to suggest that their
love was based on "100% sex" was actionable).
357. Jenkins v. Dell Publ'g Co., 143 F. Supp. 952, 954 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
358. Id. at 955.
359. Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 238 P.2d 670, 671-73 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
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enlisted in the Marine Corps. 360 "We think that men who are called to
the colors subject their activities in that particular field to the public
gaze and may not contend that in the discharge of such activities their
actions may not be publicized." 3 6 1 The court did not distinguish the
difference between agreeing to be viewed by a limited audience and
being exposed to millions on the big screen.
Courts also did not account for the medium of exposure in calculat-
ing the newsworthiness of the publication and its offensiveness to its
subject.362 When film was popularized, there had been much debate
as to whether courts would take into account the cinema's realism and
its intense impact on audiences when gauging the harms that might be
caused by film depictions of one's image or private life. Courts typi-
cally applied print media standards to film, and also to radio.363 Tele-
vision, which reached into millions of homes, potentially amplified the
harms of unwanted publicity, yet courts continued to use standards
developed in the print context. 364 "[S]ince television is the latest me-
dium for the dissemination of news, there [was] every reason for and
no reason against applying to television news broadcasts the same
rule" that applied to newspapers and magazines. 365
3. Newsworthiness
Courts often strained to identify some voluntary action that could
be construed as a waiver of privacy or consent to exposure. This was
technically unnecessary because consent to public exposure was gen-
erally implied by "participation in society" and extended to all news-
worthy material. As in the past, a substantial number of privacy cases
involving the media implicated involuntary public figures: crime vic-
tims, relatives of criminals, the lovers and family members of actors or
other public figures. In a 1962 case in which a man unsuccessfully
360. Id. at 672.
361. Id.
362. E.g., id. at 673 ("The medium of the publication . . . is not a controlling factor.").
363. See generally Smith v. Doss, 37 So. 2d 118 (Ala. 1948); Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Am.,
103 N.E. 1108 (N.Y. 1913); Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 178 N.Y.S. 752, 757-59 (App.
Div. 1919).
364. See STEIGLEMAN, supra note 226, at 229. See generally Walter D. Oppenheimer, Jr., Tele-
vision and the Right of Privacy, 1 J. BROAD. 194 (1956); J. Joseph Cummings, Comment, Televi-
sion and the Right of Privacy, 36 MARo. L. REV. 157 (1952).
365. Jacova v. S. Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 36-37 (Fla. 1955); see also Ettore v.
Philco Television Broad. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 143, 149 (E.D. Pa. 1954). In Chavez v. Hollywood
Post No. 43, which involved a televised depiction of a boxing match, a California court con-
cluded that "[a] prize fighter who participates in a public boxing match waives his right of pri-
vacy [as] to that fight." See Emilie N. Wanderer, The Right of Privacy, 56 COM. L.J. 219, 223
(1951) (quoting 15 A.L.R.2d 794 (1951)).
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sued a gossip magazine for publishing a story about his first marriage
to his high school sweetheart, who would go on to become actress
Janet Leigh, the court noted that "people closely related to such pub-
lic figures in their activities must also to some extent lose their right to
the privacy that one unconnected with the famous or notorious would
have." 3 6 6 A father who was publicized in a magazine called Official
Detective Combined with Actual Detective Stories in relation to his
son's death by drug overdose also lost his suit for invasion of pri-
vacy.3 6 7 The court concluded that the father had, by virtue of his rela-
tionship to his son, "been catapulted into an area of legitimate public
news interest."368 In Bradley v. Cowles Magazine, which involved
gruesome photographs in Look magazine of a child lynching victim,
Emmett Till, the court dismissed Till's mother's complaint of invasion
of privacy, noting that "chance or destiny may propel a private citizen
into the public gaze." 369 The families of criminals, "the householder
who is burglarized, or the victim of an accident"-all may "be equally
unwilling to be publicized," but all surrendered their right to privacy
to the extent necessary to report the news. 370
The content of the popular press continued to be characterized as
the expression of the public's concerns and interests. In a case finding
an article about a celebrity scandal in the notorious Hollywood tab-
loid Confidential to be newsworthy, a New York appellate court ob-
served that "[e]ven a cursory examination of the contents of some of
our daily newspapers makes evident that such stories are part and par-
cel of the reading habits of the American public." 371 The large "circu-
lation of magazines such as 'Confidential' is mute testimony that the
public is interested in the kind of news those magazines purvey." 372
As the Third Circuit observed:
Some readers are attracted by shocking news. Others are titillated
by sex in the news. . . . Much news is in various ways amusing and
for that reason of special interest to many people... .This may be a
disturbing commentary upon our civilization, but it is nonetheless a
realistic picture of society which courts shaping new juristic con-
cepts must take into account.373
366. Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 415 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
367. Rozhon v. Triangle Publ'ns, Inc., 230 F.2d 359, 360-61 (7th Cir. 1956).
368. Id. at 361.
369. 168 N.E.2d 64, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960).
370. See Carlisle, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
371. Goelet v. Confidential, Inc., 171 N.Y.S.2d 223, 226 (App. Div. 1958).
372. Id. at 226-27. The magazine spawned a slew of competitors, with titles like Hush-Hush,
Uncensored, Exposed, and On the Q. T. See Success in the Sewer, TIME, July 11, 1955, at 90, 90.
373. Jenkins v. Dell Publ'g Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1958).
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During the 1950s, pulp, tabloid, and true crime publications with
such titles as Official Detective Stories, Current Detective, Uncensored
Detective, and Women in Crime became a national craze. 3 7 4 Even
though the articles were, in the words of the Sixth Circuit, often a
"tasteless exploitation" of the gruesome details of violent crimes, they
were not actionable insofar as they were newsworthy.375 So long as
the material was not substantially fictionalized, the law did not distin-
guish between "news for information and news for entertainment." 376
In July 1965, Front Page Detective ran a story about a sixty-two-year-
old widow who was raped and murdered.37 7 It went on to describe the
condition of the woman's body, which was found in an alley.3 78 An
Illinois appellate court rejected the privacy claim brought by the
woman's nine children, holding the piece to be newsworthy; the maga-
zine's wide circulation indicated that it attracted the public's
interest. 379
The 1950s and 1960s saw a public fascination with juvenile delin-
quency, leading to an outpouring of crime stories involving children,
both as criminals and victims, not only in the pulp magazines, but also
in mainstream news outlets.38 0 In the pre-war era, most newspapers
had strict rules against publishing the pictures of child criminals and
victims of crime, but after World War II, such images increasingly ap-
peared, even in highly respected news publications.38 In the 1950s, a
newspaper that carried on its front page a large picture of a murdered
boy's mutilated and decomposed body was held not to be liable to the
boy's parents for invasion of privacy. 38 2 The court concluded that the
boy, though unwillingly, became part of a newsworthy event of public
interest and had therefore waived his right to privacy. 383 In Kelley v.
374. Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceed-
ings, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1961) (noting new "pulp and slick magazines and comic
books" that fabricated crime stories for the purpose of entertainment).
375. Cordell v. Detective Publ'ns, Inc. 419 F.2d. 989, 989 (6th Cir. 1969).
376. Jenkins, 251 F.2d at 451; see also Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1953)
("[T]he constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression apply with equal force to the publica-
tion whether it be a news report or an entertainment feature.").
377. Carlson v. Dell Publ'g Co., 213 N.E.2d 39, 40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965).
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. See Mueller, supra note 374, at 18.
381. STEIGLEMAN, supra note 226, at 226.
382. Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publ'g Co., 76 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1956).
383. Id. at 768 ("[T]he courts are not concerned with the canons of good taste, and pictures
which startle, shock, and even horrify may be freely published . . . if the subject of the picture
consents or if the occasion is such that his right of privacy does not protect him from the publica-
tion."); see also Abernathy v. Thornton, 83 So. 2d 235, 236-37 (Ala. 1955) (concluding that a
slain child whose photo had been taken on his way to the funeral home, with a bullet protruding
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Post Publishing Co., a newspaper published a picture of a girl killed in
a car accident.384 The picture was hideous and distorted her fea-
tures.385 The court, dismissing the claim, noted that the photo might
have been "indelicate or lacking in good taste" and "distressing to the
members of the victim's family," but was nonetheless newsworthy, as
"[miany things which are distressing or may be lacking in propriety or
good taste are not actionable." 386
Although the Supreme Court had not yet addressed the constitu-
tional dimensions of the privacy tort, courts continued to describe the
capacious newsworthiness privilege as mandated by the First Amend-
ment.387 The 1950s and 1960s saw the further liberalization of free
speech law by the Supreme Court, and the expansion of the domain of
constitutionally protected speech to include pornographic but non-ob-
scene speech and defamatory falsehoods.38 8 In cases expanding press
rights, the Court reiterated the First Amendment's protection of pub-
lishing on a wide array of public issues,389 although it did not-and
has not-articulated a broad public "right to know." Courts nonethe-
less described the newsworthiness privilege as protecting the constitu-
tional "right of the public to be informed," whether the information
was material about a politician's home and family life,390 an article
about a homicide in Official Detective Stories magazine, 391 an article
about pedestrian safety that included a photo of a child lying on the
street after being hit by a car,3 9 2 or a crime story in Front Page Detec-
from his head, "had become such a public character" that "he had thus forfeited his claim to
privacy").
384. 98 N.E.2d 286, 286-87 (Mass. 1951).
385. Id. at 287.
386. Id. at 287-88; see also Mahaffey v. Official Detective Stories, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 251 (W.D.
La. 1962); Waters v. Fleetwood, 91 S.E.2d 344 (Ga. 1956) (holding that the publication and sale
of close-up photographs of a murdered fourteen-year-old girl's body as it was recovered from a
river was not an actionable invasion of her mother's privacy because the photographs pertained
to a newsworthy matter of public interest).
387. See Gajda, supra note 6, at 1061 ("[T]he common-law privilege had been largely sub-
sumed into expanding First Amendment protection of the press .... ).
388. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957); Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
389. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1964); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270-71.
390. Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969).
391. Blount v. T.D. Publ'g Corp., 423 P.2d. 421 (N.M. 1966); see also Frith v. Associated Press,
176 F. Supp. 671, 676 (E.D.S.C. 1959) ("The public had a right to know the facts."); Miller v.
NBC, 157 F. Supp. 240, 243 (D. Del. 1957) ("On the contrary, that which the defendant appro-
priated was part of the public domain."); Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715, 717
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) ("Society has its rights. The right of privacy must be accommodated to
freedom of speech and of the press and to the right of the general public to the dissemination of
information.").
392. Leverton v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
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tive.3 93 As the Third Circuit wrote in 1958, "[T]he interest of the pub-
lic in the free dissemination of the truth and unimpeded access to
news is so broad, so difficult to define and so dangerous to circum-
scribe that courts have been reluctant to make such factually accurate
public disclosures tortious . . . ."394 The "broad privilege cloaking the
truthful publication of all newsworthy matters" was necessary to pre-
vent "the privacy tort's potential encroachment on the freedoms of
speech and the press." 395 .
4. The Effects of Exposure
"Guaranty of the right of privacy is not a guaranty of hermitic seclu-
sion," noted an Illinois appeals court in Bradley v. Cowles Magazine,
Inc. in 1960:
We live in a society geared in the opposite direction; a society that
makes public demands and imposes public duties. Every election
thrusts upon the shyest and most retiring citizen demands and obli-
gations. A political campaign brings forth public insistence that he
vote. Every television and radio program blares forth exigent calls
to do or buy this or that. The census taker asks for the furnishing of
private information. The mail brings importunities of every kind.
The telephone serves a like purpose. Finally, the revenue collector
pries into the very heart of what used to be a person's private af-
fairs-how much he earned, how much he spent, how much he gave
away.396
Because the public had gotten used to invasions of privacy and be-
cause many people actively sought publicity, mass media depictions of
one's image or private affairs were neither always unwanted nor inju-
rious.39 7 This was a conclusion that was shared by many postwar soci-
ologists and critics. In the 1950s and 1960s, commentators pointed to
the rise of reality television-game shows like Queen for a Day, in
which housewives told their sad, true stories, and the saddest won
393. Jenkins v. Dell Publ'g Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958); see also Donahue v. Warner Bros.
Pictures Distrib. Corp., 272 P.2d 177, 183 (Utah 1954) ("Where the right of privacy of the indi-
vidual is pitted against the general weal, we give some consideration to the precept that the best
social policy is that which results in the greatest good to the greatest number .... ).
394. Jenkins, 251 F.2d at 451; see also Jacova v. S. Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 40
(Fla. 1955) ("[S]ince the preservation of our American democracy depends upon the public's
receiving information speedily . . . it is vital that no unreasonable restraints be placed upon the
working news reporter or the editorial writer.").
395. Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969).
396. 168 N.E.2d 64, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960).
397. As Harry Kalven, Jr. wrote, "[T]hose who will come forward with privacy claims will very
often have shabby, unseemly grievances and an interest in exploitation." Harry Kalven, Jr.,
Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 326, 338
(1966).
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prizes-as evidence of a widespread desire for mass publicity. For
much of the populace, wrote sociologist Edward Shils, "a wide diffu-
sion through television or press is welcomed."398
Thus, in the 1954 case of Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., the court
held that the plaintiff had no right to be offended by the publication of
his photograph in a national magazine because he was portrayed in a
sympathetic manner.399 In Meetze v. Associated Press, a newspaper
article reporting that a twelve-year-old mother had given birth to a
healthy, normal son and giving the names of the mother and her
twenty-year-old husband was held not to be an invasion of the
couple's right of privacy because the matter of giving birth was itself
not embarrassing or humiliating.400 In Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co.,
the majority noted that the plaintiffs had no reason to complain about
the magazine photo depicting their public embrace because the pic-
ture was quite "complimentary and pleasing." 401
B. Privacy in Postwar America
1. Panicking About Privacy
There was a privacy panic in the 1950s and 1960s, and the anxiety
may well have surpassed the intensity of the panic of the late nine-
teenth century.402 As in the 1890s, many of the perceived threats were
posed by new technologies. Government projects during World War
II and the Cold War, as well as the growth of the private detective
trade since the war, had produced new technological innovations that
threatened privacy: tiny listening bugs, microphones, miniaturized
cameras, closed-circuit television, telephoto lenses, and infrared light
technology, among others.403 The "microminiaturization, simplifica-
tion .... ,cost reduction, and widespread distribution" of these devices
in the 1950s and 1960s facilitated increased state surveillance of pri-
vate activities.404 Government monitoring of political protest through
wiretapping and other methods of surveillance surged during the
McCarthy era, the civil rights movement, and the Vietnam War.40 5
Polygraphs and psychological "personality testing" had been present
since the early twentieth century but were brought into greatly in-
398. Shils, supra note 42, at 303.
399. 122 F. Supp. 327, 329 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
400. 95 S.E.2d 606 (S.C. 1956).
401. 253 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1953).
402. See DEBORAH NELSON, PURSUING PRIVACY IN COLD WAR AMERICA 9 (2002).
403. See WESTIN, supra note 16, at 67.
404. See id. at 103, 119.
405. LANE, supra note 26, at 133-35 (describing the 1950s as the "wiretapping decade").
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creased use for both corporate and government purposes. 406 Massive
data collection became a concern with the rise of the first primitive
computers in the 1950s.4 0 7
Protests and fears around actual and threatened invasions of pri-
vacy crested in the early to mid-1960s, 40 8 with press expos6s of govern-
ment surveillance activities, new computer technologies, and what
seemed to be a surfeit of eavesdropping and recording devices mar-
keted for personal use. 409 The Supreme Court's increasing attention
to privacy and its recognition in Griswold v. Connecticut that various
provisions of the Bill of Rights "create zones of privacy" 410 intensified
the popular sentiment that privacy was a core aspect of individual lib-
erty that must be zealously protected and defended.411 A series of
popular and scholarly books, with ominous titles like The Assault on
Privacy and The Naked Society, were published in the mid-1960s as
attention focused on proposals for a national data center, a govern-
ment agency that would compile dossiers of private information on
every citizen, which ultimately never materialized. 412 As a writer in
the New York Times lamented in 1966, "What has been described as
an age of alienation is, in truth, an age in which no one can ever be
sure he is alone." 413
By the 1960s, the state had largely replaced the press as the focus of
the public's privacy anxieties. Tabloids and pulp magazines, though
deplored by many, were regarded as an inevitable nuisance, and inva-
sions of privacy by the news media in the form of expos6s of govern-
ment and corporate misdeeds were often celebrated by the public.
The postwar era saw acclaimed investigative reporting on government
efforts to conceal the truth about the Vietnam War and the repression
and persecution of civil rights activists by Southern officials. 414 Ac-
cording to Amy Gajda, these led to a romantic, heroic image of the
crusading journalist and increasing "deference to journalists in defin-
406. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 211-78.
407. See LANE, supra note 26, at 145.
408. See Symposium, Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251 (1966).
409. See WESTIN, supra note 16, at 179-80, 195-96; see also Robert R. Kirsch, Individual Pri-
vacy Loss: With Us Here, Now, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 15, 1964, at D18 ("[Olne by-product of the
electronic age is the use of listening, viewing and snooping devices which are becoming ubiqui-
tous, and the employment of computer, memory bank devices which are the most efficient and
accessible filing devices ever made.").
410. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)
411. See LANE, supra note 26, at 155-56.
412. Id. at 144-49; Nan Robertson, Data Center Held Peril to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
1966, at 41.
413. Editorial, Curbing Electronic Snoopers, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 1966, at 38.
414. See AUcOIN, supra note 344, at 51-52.
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ing newsworthiness" in the free speech context.415 New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, which instituted the actual malice standard that must
be met before press reports about public officials can be considered
libelous, grew out of reporting on the civil rights movement.416 The
Sullivan case issued the canonical statement that democracy requires a
free press and that the First Amendment dictates "that debate on pub-
lic issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 4 17
In 1967, the actual malice standard was applied to the New York
privacy statute in Time, Inc. v. Hill.4 1 8 In that case, the Court over-
turned the decision of the New York Court of Appeals upholding a
jury award for Life magazine's invasion of the Hill family's privacy
under the New York privacy statute.419 Hill and his family had been
held hostage in their home by escaped convicts, and the ordeal was
made into a play that was highly fictionalized. 420 Life magazine dis-
closed the identity of the Hill family in an illustrated news story about
the play and described the play as true.421 The Supreme Court ruled
"that the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the
application of the New York statute to redress false reports of matters
of public interest" absent proof that the publisher knew of their falsity
or acted "in reckless disregard of the truth."422
The majority opinion in Hill summarized many of the themes and
conclusions of the privacy cases of the previous thirty years. Justice
Brennan defined the ambit of constitutional protection as "matters of
public interest," which he appeared to equate with press content-in
other words, newsworthy material.423 "[T]he vast range of published
matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and
public officials," was at the heart of the First Amendment's protec-
tions.424 "Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a con-
comitant of life in a civilized community," and "the risk of this
415. Gajda, supra note 6, at 1067-68.
416. 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
417. Id. at 270.
418. 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
419. Id. at 387-91.
420. Id. at 378.
421. Id. at 378-79.
422. Id. at 387-88.
423. Id. at 388. In Brennan's opinion, "newsworthiness define[d] the ambit of constitutional
concern." Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and
Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267, 282. "The newsworthy is a kind of speech which is public
enough so that its protection cannot be left entirely to state policy." Id. at 281.
424. Hill, 385 U.S. at 388.
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exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a
primary value on freedom of speech and of press." 425
2. Privacy Protections Beyond the Law
Like the Sullivan case, journalists and the legal academy celebrated
the Hill decision, but a few dissenting voices, concerned with what
they perceived as declining journalistic standards, wondered whether
the press had acquired too much freedom.426 It is not quite apt to say
that journalism "got worse" or that ethics codes were not followed. In
many ways, the professionalization of journalism, which reached a
high point in this period, led to a greater focus by reporters on social
responsibility and ethical canons.427 At the same time, driven by the
trend toward investigative journalism and by market pressures, partic-
ularly the competition initiated by television, the news media em-
barked on more detailed, graphic, and sensationalistic coverage of
personal affairs. Critics lamented "the style of television reporting
that thrusts a microphone under the chin of a woman who has
watched her child [being] injured and urges her to tell the viewers how
she feels." 428 One commentator in the 1960s noted NBC's "remorse-
less focusing" on sustained close-ups of bleeding corpses and notori-
ous incidents in which the family members of murder victims were
pursued and assaulted by TV reporters. 429 To compete with televi-
sion, print journalism delved deeper into the sensational and the per-
sonal.430 In a break with past practice, many papers ran the names,
addresses, and other identifying details of crime victims, juvenile de-
linquents, and attempted suicides.431 "In the rare cases when names
[were] withheld," noted one critic, news stories often included so
many details about the victims that it was easy to determine their
identities. 432 A writer in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review
425. Id.
426. See Marshall S. Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality: An Essay on Legal Regulation of
Public Communication, 46 TEX. L. REV. 650 (1968); J. Skelly Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and
the Public's Right to Know: A National Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEX. L. REV. 630
(1968). The most prominent critic was legal academic Edward Bloustein. See BLOUSTEIN, Supra
note 156.
427. See MAKING JOURNALISTS 101-02 (Hugo de Burgh ed., 2005).
428. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 1043.
429. Jack Gould, TV: Questions of Taste and Restraint, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1963, at 63; see
also PACKARD, supra note 330, at 217 (noting that "[tielevision is the most intimate of the me-
dia" and that in the early 1960s television reporters and cameramen had come under fire for
"pressing too hard for raw drama in covering some news events").
430. See AucoIN, supra note 344, at 75-76.
431. See Ignaz Rothenberg, Newspaper Sins Against Privacy, NIEMAN REP., Jan. 1957, at 41.
432. Id. at 43; see also JOHN PAUL JONES, THE MODERN REPORTER'S HANDBOOK 90-91, 128
(1949) (noting that about seventy-five percent of newspapers in a three-hundred-newspaper
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noted that there was an obsession with the "criminal acts of youth" 433
and that without juvenile delinquency, "many [American] newspapers
might have to go into receivership." 434 Media coverage of the Viet-
nam War introduced a new trend toward graphic photojournalism. 435
The emphasis on "behind the scenes" reporting led to more searching
coverage of politicians and their private lives, though their sex lives
were still off limits, a taboo that would vanish by the 1970s. 436
Claiming a mission to root out political corruption, journalists were
increasingly using the tactics of the government actors they wanted to
expose. Descriptions of press conduct in a 1964 journalism text titled
The Press and Its Problems noted that reporters were eavesdropping,
hiding in closets, and posing "as detectives, coroners' assistants, or
other public or semi-public officials to gain access to places from
which they otherwise would be barred." "They may steal photo-
graphs, peek through windows, climb fire escapes to effect entrances
into apartments . . . and virtually besiege the dwelling of someone
reluctant to be interviewed." 437 In 1969, during the Democratic Na-
tional Convention in Chicago, one of NBC's news directors was in-
dicted by a federal grand jury for bugging hotel rooms in which the
party's Platform Committee was meeting.438
Surveillance technology and trends in journalism facilitated and en-
couraged deeper incursions into the personal and private, and social
norms were less likely to restrain them. In the 1960s, sociologists ob-
served an intensified public fascination-"a particular and dangerous
form of curiosity"-with "the privacies of personal life, especially sex-
ual conduct among the socially prominent." 439 There appeared to be
greater public acceptance of gruesome images and intimate scenarios
in the media, depictions that would have been considered indecent
only a few decades earlier. As an editor noted, public tastes had
sample polled reported "the names of juveniles involved in police charges or juvenile delin-
quency of any kind" and that although many papers adopted a "standard policy" of not reporting
the names of rape victims, they did report names when the victim was a "person of great public
prominence" or the crime led to a public trial).
433. See Mueller, supra note 374, at 18 (quoting Governor Signs End of Youth Court Act, N.Y.
WORLD TELEGRAM & SUN, Mar. 29, 1961, at 12).
434. Id. (quoting Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, Criminal Law and Administration, 34 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 83, 113 (1959)).
435. See JOHN L. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MOTIVES: ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE NEWS
MEDIA 53-57, 169-72 (1976).
436. See Summers, supra note 313, at 838.
437. Willard H. Pedrick, Publicity and Privacy: Is It Any of Our Business?, 20 U. TORONTO
L.J. 391, 391 (1970) (quoting MACDOUGALL, supra note 320, at 338).
438. Joseph W. Bishop Jr., Privacy vs. Protection-The Bugged Society, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
June 8, 1969, at 117.
439. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 55.
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"changed considerably since the world war," leading to "a general re-
laxing of taboos." 440 A noted sociologist, writing in 1964 on what he
saw as an erosion of privacy norms, observed that "[t]he intimacies of
other persons are 'interesting,' and where they are degrading to the
mighty and great, they are all the more acceptable. The embarrass-
ments of those who have discomfiting disclosures made about them
are as attractive as a boxing match." 441 The television show Candid
Camera, which broadcast hidden camera footage of ordinary people
being confronted with unusual, often embarrassing situations, became
wildly popular. 442 "Smile, you're on candid camera" became the
catchphrase of a generation that had become increasingly aware of,
and fascinated with, the possibility of constant media surveillance. 443
This is not to suggest that the public accepted these trends without
question or protest. A critic noted in 1959 that "public opinion, in
growing degree, angrily reacts to violations of privacy by journal-
ists." 444 The 1950s and 1960s saw a nationwide campaign against the
scandal magazines 445 and the formation of citizen activist groups for
improving the media.446 Audiences continued to register their dissat-
isfaction with editors and broadcasters, particularly around the prac-
tice of publicizing the names and pictures of crime victims, 447 although
such pressure may have been less likely to affect editorial decision
making than in the past. The continued growth of large-scale media
440. MACDOUGALL, supra note 320, at 119.
441. See Shils, supra note 42, at 302.
442. PACKARD, supra note 330, at 217.
443. See CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN MODERN
CULTURE 41-42 (2000).
444. Ignaz Rothenberg, Invasion of Privacy in the Codes of Journalists, NIEMAN REP., Oct.
1959, at 5.
445. Governor Knight of California launched an effort to destroy Confidential through crimi-
nal libel suits. See Mary Desjardins, Systematizing Scandal: Confidential Magazine, Stardom,
and the State of California, in HEADLINE HOLLYWOOD: A CENTURY OF FILM SCANDAL 206,
206-31 (Adrienne L. McLean & David A. Cook eds., 2001). Frank Sinatra also brought a highly
publicized privacy case against Look magazine, which he envisioned as a "test case" for the
privacy rights of all celebrities. "Up until now," he said, "the courts have never really clarified
the extent to which a public figure is entitled to a right of privacy. I feel that it is time we had a
specific understanding and definition of these rights and I hope this may be the case that estab-
lishes it." Sinatra Drops His Libel Suit for $2,300,000, supra note 342.
446. In the 1960s, two major citizen groups-the Action for Children's Television and the
National Citizens' Committee for Broadcasting-achieved national reputations as organizations
for improving the media. See WILLIAM L. RIVERS ET AL., RESPONSIBILITY IN MASS COMMUNI-
CATION 287 (3d ed. 1980).
447. See Rothenberg, supra note 444.
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conglomerates increasingly distanced publishers from their audiences
and tended to diminish accountability. 448
By the end of the 1960s, many of the safeguards against media de-
pictions of the private that had once been provided by social norms of
privacy and editorial practices had diminished without any increase in
legal protection. Recognizing this, in a few notable decisions from
this period, courts rejected deference to editorial judgment on the
newsworthiness issue. In Patterson v. Tribune Co., the court reversed
an earlier finding for the newspaper on the grounds that it had acted
irresponsibly in printing material about a woman's commitment to a
hospital for drug addiction. 449 The material was not in the public re-
cord, and the editors had failed to adhere to the public "responsibility
which the newspaper fraternity recognizes in its self-governing
code." 4 5 0 In Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., the court dismissed
a motion for summary judgment brought by the publisher of several
true crime magazines, concluding that it could not say as a matter of
law that the articles about the plaintiffs, murder suspects, constituted
legitimate news reporting. 451 The sensational nature of the magazine,
which ran stories with titles such as Mystery of the Hanging Corpse,
suggested that it was trying to pass off fiction as news.4 5 2 In Wagner v.
Fawcett Publications, a highly publicized 1962 case involving magazine
448. See MICHAEL EMERY & EDWIN EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA 532, 536-37 (7th ed.
1992).
449. 146 So. 2d 623, 626-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
450. Id. at 626. The court commented:
Our metropolitan newspapers . .. are among the technological marvels of the age.
They render invaluable public service. They exert tremendous impact on the economy
and are vitally important in the gathering and dissemination of news and views....
Their editorial pronouncements, subjectively impersonal, make them almost pontifical
in their capacity to influence public opinion; and they are rightly blest with the constitu-
tional guaranty of freedom of the press. Such power imposes corresponding responsi-
bility ....
Id.
451. 97 F. Supp. 546, 548-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
452. Id. at 549; see also Annerino v. Dell Publ'g Co., 149 N.E.2d 761, 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958)
("There is no difficulty in ascertaining that what plaintiff complains of is not news reporting, but
the use of her photograph in connection with a 'story' which makes a strong appeal to the idle
and prurient."). In a few reported cases, courts found material to be non-newsworthy when it
challenged prevailing views of gender and sexual modesty. When a newspaper ran a photo of a
woman whose skirt was blown up around her waist as she stepped over an air vent as she
emerged from a funhouse at a public fairground, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed an
award of several thousand dollars against the newspaper, finding the material not to be news-
worthy. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964). In Harms v. Miami Daily
News, Inc., a Florida appellate court found an article urging readers to call a woman's phone
number if they "[w]anna hear a sexy telephone voice" to have no relationship whatsoever to the
news. 127 So. 2d 715, 716, 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961)
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stories of the gruesome rape and murder of the plaintiff's daughter,453
the Seventh Circuit held the publication to be actionable because the
article had been published two months after the girl's death.454 The
court observed, "When the news media have served their proper func-
tion in reporting current events, private individuals involved therein
sink back into the solitude which is the right of every person." 455 But
such outcomes were not typical and were contrary to the dominant
position that "the right of privacy is generally inferior and subordinate
to the dissemination of news." 456
3. Post-1970s Trends
Since the 1970s, competition in the media industries and a "preoc-
cupation with marketing, promotion, and market share" have led to
the "tabloidization" of journalism, the rise of "infotainment," and new
genres-reality television and talk shows, among them-that seek to
shock and titillate with more explicit displays of the private.457 The
rise of the media-driven political sex scandal in this period largely de-
stroyed the possibility of privacy for public figures, and mainstream
publishing abandoned longstanding taboos against the exposure of the
sexual.458 Courts nonetheless continued to defer to the press on the
issue of newsworthiness. 459 In the words of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, "To a considerable extent, .... the publishers and broadcast-
ers have themselves defined the term . . ."460 Items that have been
held to be newsworthy have included the death of a child in an un-
453. No. 13541 (7th Cir. June 18, 1962), rev'd on rehearing, 307 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962).
454. Id.
455. Id. However, upon rehearing, the court reversed itself on the ground that the events in
question were still current because the legal proceedings were still taking place against the ac-
cused at the time of the publication. 307 F.2d at 411.
456. Blount v. T.D. Publ'g Corp., 423 P.2d 421, 424 (N.M. 1966).
457. Andrew Calabrese, Political Space and the Trade in Television News, in TABLOID TALES:
GLOBAL DEBATES OVER MEDIA STANDARDS 43, 44 (Colin Sparks & John Tulloch eds., 2000).
458. Thomas Nagel describes the media circus around President Clinton's sexual affairs as the
shredding of public privacy. See NAGEL, supra note 16, at 27.
459. Although, as Amy Gajda has suggested, "some courts have grown distinctly less deferen-
tial to journalism in privacy cases" in response to public dissatisfaction with the sensationalism of
news reporting. See Gajda, supra note 6, at 1042. In 2006, for example, a court held that a gossip
story in a Washington newspaper about a CNN assignment editor that named several men she
had dated was categorically "not a matter of public concern." Benz v. Wash. Newspaper Publ'g
Co., No. 05-1760 (EGS), 2006 WL 2844896 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2006).
460. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g (1977); see also Heath v. Playboy En-
ters., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("[W]hat is newsworthy is primarily a
function of the publisher, not the courts."); Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publ'g Co., 543 P.2d 988, 996
(Kan. 1975) ("A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is
not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated." (quoting
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974))).
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locked refrigerator;461 the identity of a woman who abandoned a new-
born child;462 the gruesome close-up of a murder victim's skull;463 the
extrication of a woman from a crashed car;464 a sex-change opera-
tion;4 6 5 and a photograph of a participant in a high school soccer game
that displayed his exposed genitalia, among others.466 Although the
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutional dimensions of
tort liability for invasions of privacy by public exposure,467 the broad
newsworthiness standard continues to be framed in terms of freedom
of the press, the public's right to access the news, and the public
interest.468
Many of the most controversial cases in recent decades involving
the public exposure of private material in the media have involved
names, addresses, and identifying details about intimate or private af-
fairs, often involving tragic circumstances. 469 Such details have often
been held newsworthy because they add "color" or credibility to re-
porting.470 As Judge Richard Posner observed in a case upholding, on
461. Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Div. 1970).
462. Pasadena Star-News v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 249 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Ct. App. 1988).
463. Abernathy v. Thornton, 83 So. 2d 235 (Ala. 1955).
464. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
465. Schuler v. McGraw-Hill Co., No. 97-2225, 1998 WL 193132 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 1998).
466. McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). But see
Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the publication
of the fact that the plaintiff, a transsexual, underwent gender corrective surgery and became a
woman was not newsworthy); Green v. Chi. Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
(mother's grief-stricken statements upon seeing her son's dead body); Pohle v. Cheatham, 724
N.E.2d 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (sexually explicit photo); Gallon v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 732
F. Supp. 322 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (sexually explicit photo); Hawkins v. Multimedia, Inc., 344 S.E.2d
145, 146 (S.C. 1986) ("Public or general interest does not mean mere curiosity, and newsworthi-
ness is not necessarily the test.").
467. The Court has ruled, however, that in cases involving mass media disclosure of private
facts obtained from public records, the First Amendment forbids liability for the publication of
truthful information except when doing so would contravene "a state interest of the highest
order." The Court has yet to define the protection of personal privacy as an "interest of the
highest order." Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979); see also Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001); Fla. Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 524-25 (1989); Cox Broad.
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 475 (1975).
468. As one judge observed, regardless of whether the press caters to the public's preexisting
tastes or "creates the demand for shocking, scandalous, pathetic, or titillating 'human interest'
news by providing a supply," the fact remains that people consume the media, and therefore,
publishers must be addressing the public's interests. See Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Co., 712
P.2d 803, 809 n.9 (Or. 1986).
469. According to one study, 63.4% of newspaper stories and 42.2% of television stories name
crime victims. STEVEN M. CHERMAK, VicrIMs IN THE NEWS 127 tbl.5.4 (1995).
470. But see Capra v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n of N. Am., Inc., 787 F.2d 463 (9th Cir.
1986) (concluding that a reasonable jury could find the identification of plaintiffs to be either
highly offensive or not newsworthy); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990) (concluding that a reasonable jury could find the identification of plaintiffs as users
of in vitro fertilization offensive and therefore not newsworthy).
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First Amendment grounds, the reporting of private facts about an or-
dinary citizen ("his heavy drinking, his unstable unemployment, his
adultery, his irresponsible and neglectful behavior toward his wife and
children"), "[r]eporting the true facts about real people is necessary to
'obviate any impression that the [general social] problems raised in
the [reporting] are remote or hypothetical."'47 1 In Ross v. Midwest
Communications, Inc., where a rape victim sued a television station
for broadcasting a documentary about rape that used her actual first
name and a picture of her residence,472 the Fifth Circuit affirmed sum-
mary judgment for the journalists, holding that the details reported
were newsworthy as a matter of law: "Communicating that this partic-
ular victim was a real person with roots in the community ... [was] of
unique importance to the credibility and persuasive force of the
story."473
The celebrity's presumed waiver of privacy remains expansive. In a
representative case, when an actress sued a website for publishing her
home address, the court held that the disclosure was not actionable
because the address was not private, given the "tours and maps of-
fered of 'Star's Homes' throughout Los Angeles County," and that by
becoming an entertainment celebrity, the actress took on the risk that
her domestic life would be exposed to the public.474 Ordinary people,
no less than celebrities, are still held to assume the risk of media pub-
licity by conducting "newsworthy" activities in public view.475 For ex-
471. See Haynes v. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Gilbert v.
Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981)).
472. 870 F.2d 271, 272 (5th Cir. 1989).
473. Id. at 274. But see Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 755 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (concluding
that, although domestic violence in general was of legitimate public concern, "[p]laintiffs' per-
sonal involvement in an incident of domestic violence [was not] newsworthy as a matter of law");
Doe v. Univision Television Grp., Inc., 717 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (although the
subject of poorly performed plastic surgery in foreign countries was a matter of public interest,
plaintiff's identity was not).
474. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2002). How-
ever, a federal district court in California found that a videotape of celebrity couple Pamela
Anderson Lee and Bret Michaels having sex not to be newsworthy and that they did not waive
their right to privacy over their sex lives even though they had appeared in sexually charged
contexts as public performers. The court was "not prepared to conclude that public exposure of
one sexual encounter forever removes a person's privacy interest in all subsequent and previous
sexual encounters." Michaels v. Internet Entm't Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 840 (C.D. Cal.
1998). A California appellate court concluded that a newspaper report on the personal affairs of
actor Eddie Murphy's son and former girlfriend were not newsworthy because they "were pri-
vate citizens who never sought to publicize their relationship to Mr. Murphy." Hood v. Nat'l
Enquirer, Inc., No. B082611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (unpublished opinion).
475. See, e.g., Sandler v. Calcagni, 565 F. Supp. 2d 184, 198 (D. Me. 2008) (holding that cos-
metic nasal surgery is "by its nature exposed to the public eye" and not "truly private");
Cheatham v. Paisano Publ'ns, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (a photo of plaintiff's
fishnet covered posterior at a biker's convention was not private); Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F.
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ample, in 2002, a film producer and distributor followed a woman into
a nightclub bathroom and filmed her kissing a man in a stall, then
played that film on a television program and used the photo of a scene
to advertise the program nationwide on the Internet. The district
court concluded that the woman's kissing the man was not a private
act because the woman had earlier kissed the same man on a city side-
walk in plain view.476 Private facts can become public even if they are
disclosed to only a few persons.477 In Duran v. Detroit News, Inc., a
Colombian judge who had been threatened by drug lords fled her na-
tive country.478 She used her name when shopping and eating at res-
taurants and told a few neighbors who she was. 479 Local reporters
disclosed her address and her history.480 The court held that by con-
ducting activities in stores and other public places, she had made her
identity public.481
Courts remain suspicious of the harms alleged by media displays of
private life, reasoning that, as the Supreme Court of Indiana observed
in 1997, "[i]n our . .. age of talk shows, tabloids, and twelve-step pro-
grams, public disclosures of private facts are far less likely to cause
shock, offense, or emotional distress than at the time Warren and
Brandeis wrote their famous article." 482 Earlier gendered assump-
Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (plaintiff portrayed with zipper open at a football game); Livingston
v. Ky. Post, 14 Media L. Rptr., 2076 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1987) (photo of plaintiff exiting from Port-O-
Let). But see Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 525 P.2d 984 (Idaho 1974) (holding that the portrayal of
plaintiffs arrest in the nude on his front porch in open view was actionable if malicious).
476. Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
477. For a discussion of this binary model of privacy, see Madell, supra note 6, at 923-24. But
see Lowe v. Hearst Commc'ns, Inc., 487 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2007); M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107
Cal. Rptr. 2d 504 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[T]he claim of a right of privacy is not so much one of total
secrecy as it is of the right to define one's circle of intimacy . . . . Information disclosed to a few
people may remain private." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v.
Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that when the plaintiff told "a
relatively small number of people" about his AIDS status, it was not a public fact). In Y.G. v.
Jewish Hospital of St. Louis, a couple that was participating in a hospital's in vitro fertilization
program attended a social function commemorating the program's anniversary. 795 S.W.2d 488,
492 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). They sued the hospital and a television station for invasion of privacy
after the station filmed them at the function without permission. Id. at 492. The trial court
granted the defendants' motions to dismiss. Id. at 493. Reversing and remanding, the appeals
court held that the plaintiffs had not waived their right to privacy by merely attending the func-
tion, where they chose to disclose their participation only to other participating couples. Id. at
502-03.
478. 504 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Duran v. Detroit News, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
482. Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 692 (Ind. 1997). The dominant position is still
that the offensiveness criterion is met only when the disclosures are extremely intrusive and
uncomplimentary. See, e.g., Grunseth v. Marriott Corp., 872 F. Supp. 1069, 1075 (D.D.C. 1995);
Key v. Compass Bank, Inc., 826 So. 2d 159, 165 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001). As Jeffrey Rosen writes,
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tions about sensitivity to exposure are less closely held. In Cape Pub-
lications, Inc. v. Bridges, the female plaintiff was said to suffer no
exposure of intimate details when she was photographed, clad only in
a dish towel, while escaping from her estranged husband.483 The court
held that embarrassing and awkward as the situation might be, the
only intimate details revealed would also be revealed by an ordinary
bikini.484 From 1974 to 1984, plaintiffs prevailed in less than seven
percent of cases against the media involving the publication of private
material. 485 Critics began to pronounce the tort officially "dead."486
V. CONCLUSION: PRIVACY PAST AND FUTURE
In sum, the doctrinal foundations of modern tort privacy law were
forged largely between the 1920s and the 1950s, a period that saw the
rise of celebrity culture, the emergence of modern constitutional free
speech jurisprudence, and a "culture of exposure" in which earlier
prohibitions on public expressions of the private were being shed in
favor of greater openness and self-disclosure. 487 Within this context,
as we have seen, despite the weakness of privacy law, social norms,
public pressure on journalists, and self-imposed professional standards
protected privacy in ways that would diminish over time.4 8 8 By the
end of the twentieth century, titillating behind-the-scenes reporting,
"twenty-four-hour news . . . , and celebrity gossip and rumor-heavy
websites" had become central features of the media landscape. 489 To-
day, material that would have once alarmed audiences now merely
amuses.490 News websites and blogs often operate without the edito-
rial controls of professional journalism, and the technological capaci-
ties of the web permit the details of our private lives to be
"In order to be actionable today, the disclosure of embarrassing facts has to be so outrageous
that it verges on voyeurism or obscenity, leaving no doubt that the exposure would shame and
humiliate a person of ordinary sensibilities in any community." ROSEN, supra note 16, at 52.
483. 423 So. 2d 426, 427-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
484. Id. But see McCabe v. Village Voice, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that
a published photograph of the plaintiff nude in a bathtub, together with a caption naming the
plaintiff, was not newsworthy because it "serve[d] no legitimate purpose of disseminating news"
and needlessly exposed aspects of the plaintiff's private life to the public (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
485. Plaintiffs prevailed in twelve percent of cases involving nonmedia defendants over the
same period. RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS 116 tbl.6-6 (1987).
486. Mintz, supra note 4, at 426 ("[O]ne third of the Supreme Court and most of privacy
academia have pronounced dead the more than century-old tort of public disclosure of private
facts."); see also Bezanson, supra note 7, at 1174 (asking that the tort be "formally interred").
487. See generally GURSTEIN, supra note 43.
488. See generally CALVERT, supra note 443. See also McClurg, supra note 6, at 1087.
489. Gajda, supra note 6, at 1042.
490. See Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 723 (1999).
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documented and displayed to the world in an instant.491 Legal rules
are premised on assumptions about technologies and social condi-
tions; as conditions change, rules must be revisited. 492 The threats to
privacy posed by new technologies, and the erosion of the norms and
practices that once provided a shield, however partial, from the public
gaze, urge a reexamination of many of privacy law's foundational
premises.
The most obvious matter for reconsideration is the newsworthiness
standard. This Article has argued that the principle that courts should
generally defer to the media's judgment as to what is a newsworthy
matter of public concern emerged from a particular set of historical
circumstances. The broad definition of "news" and "matters of public
concern" reflected the cultural populism and civil libertarianism that
began to shape popular political thought in the 1930s and 1940s; it
originated in a period when there were in fact substantial legal restric-
tions on publishing and reporting and when morals regulations
threatened to exert a chilling effect on the dissemination of news and
popular entertainment. Most of these content and viewpoint-based
restrictions have since been abolished, however, due in part to devel-
opments in constitutional free speech law.4 9 3 The problem we may
now face is not so much an inhibited press or a dearth of news, but-
particularly given the explosion of information online-too much
information.
While the "right to know" and the "free flow of information" have
been modern ideals, there are also, as Daniel Solove aptly puts it, vir-
tues to knowing less.4 94 While private facts may help us assess peo-
ple's character and trustworthiness, 495 and vivid details may make
reporting seem more credible,496 such information can also seriously
491. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, From Bricks to Pajamas: The Law and Economics of
Amateur Journalism, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 185 (2006). See also Madell, supra note 6, at 920
(noting the need for a more precise newsworthiness standard because "people have lost the
protection of an institutional news media and because the very essence of a community-norms
approach is obliterated by the global context of the Internet"); Rodney A. Smolla, Will Tabloid
Journalism Ruin the First Amendment for the Rest of Us?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. &
POL'Y 1, 9-10 (1998).
492. Gewirtz, supra note 18, at 170.
493. See id. at 171 ("[Tihe press today is not seriously endangered by government restrictions,
and individual speakers are not seriously threatened by government-imposed conformity of
viewpoint. Debate about public issues and public figures is extremely vigorous. The boundaries
of the permissible have been extended very far out.").
494. See Solove, supra note 6.
495. See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394-95 (1978).
496. Randall Bezanson argues that detailed reporting on private life may have "significant
[F]irst [A]mendment value when viewed in the context of journalistic methods." The "medium
must . . . appeal to highly diverse frames of reference, and in reaching its audience, the news
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mislead and distract.497 Many news stories could be reported just as
effectively, if not more so, without identifying information. 498 The
media's focus on the private lives of public officials can distort their
achievements and steer public attention away from political issues of
real importance.499 In an observation that has grown increasingly
meaningful over the years, Warren and Brandeis wrote about gossip
trivializing public discourse and "usurp[ing] the place of interest in
brains capable of other things."500 The argument, first suggested in
the interwar period, that we may need mass-circulated gossip and inti-
mate personal stories to forge social connections and common bonds
among a diverse public may still be true to some extent. Yet that idea
originated at a time when there was much less information about pri-
vate lives circulating in the public sphere.
There is also good reason to question the assumption that the press
represents the public's interest. The class-based nature of the conflict
over popular media in the early to mid-twentieth century encouraged
a characterization of the press as the representative of the mass pub-
lic, rather than social elites. Of course, the press has never been the
true proxy of the "public interest"-if ever such an interest could be
defined. While media content tracks public values and trends, it also
creates those priorities and interests.50 Nonetheless, if publishers
were ever closely in tune with the public's tastes and concerns, those
days have arguably passed. The practice of local journalism has de-
publisher must use means directed toward reducing or eliminating the variety of initial barriers
to understanding or perceiving a given subject matter." Means of accomplishing this include
"personalization" or "other intimate personal details to which people can relate in a fairly direct
way." Bezanson, supra note 156, at 1071.
497. See ROSEN, supra note 16, at 156.
498. Solove, supra note 6, at 1021 (noting that, "historically, stories of paramount importance
have not identified the critical parties"; for example, the reporting on Watergate relied on a
pseudonymous source). But see Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 356 ("A factual report that fails to
name its sources or the persons it describes is properly subject to serious credibility problems.").
Whether a story is news, as Marc Franklin pointed out many years ago, is a question separable
from whether the identities of the people involved are part of that news. See Marc A. Franklin,
A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN.
L. REV. 107, 116 (1963).
499. As Paul Gewirtz has noted, "[I]nformation about the private lives of public officials so
readily distracts us from their official actions that limiting press coverage of these private matters
would likely enhance the public discourse and public debate that is at the heart of the First
Amendment's purposes." Gewirtz, supra note 18, at 183; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Images ofa
Free Press, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1246, 1263 (1992) (book review).
500. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196.
501. The media perform an "agenda-setting function": they tell us not only what to think
about particular issues, but what issues to focus on in the first place. Maxwell E. McCombs &
Donald L. Shaw, The Agenda-Setting Function of the Mass Media, 36 PUB. OPINION Q. 176, 177
(1972).
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clined, and editors and publishers often operate at great distance from
their readers, both culturally and geographically.50 2 Many journalists
believe that the press may also be less in touch with the needs and
interests of the public than it once was because of increasing concerns
with the bottom line.503 Gallup polls show a decline in the public's
confidence in the media. 504 The First Amendment Center's 2009 State
of the First Amendment survey reported that thirty-nine percent of
the adults surveyed believe that the press in America "has too much
freedom to do what it wants."505 Sixty-nine percent of those surveyed
by a 2011 Pew Center poll believed that "news organizations invade
people's privacy." 506
A familiar counterargument contends that media exposures of the
private must be serving the public's interest or else audiences would
not bother with them: the economic survival of publishers and broad-
casters depends upon their ability to provide a product that the public
will consume.507 Yet the domain of socially valuable-and constitu-
tionally protected-speech is not defined by what the public will buy.
Defamation law draws a distinction between "matters of public inter-
est"-information that is relevant to democratic self-governance-
and material that "the public is interested in"-matters that people
are curious about.50 8 The Supreme Court has declared "matters of
public concern" to be at the heart of the First Amendment's protec-
tion,509 and their discussion promotes the values protected by the con-
502. See FCC, THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES (2011) (noting that newspapers
and television stations have half the staff that they did in the 1980s and one consequence of this
is the demise of local reporting).
503. See Anita L. Allen, Why Journalists Can't Protect Privacy, in JOURNALISM AND THE DE-
BATE OVER PRIVACY, supra note 168, at 69; Richard L. Karcher, Tort Law and Journalism Eth-
ics, 40 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 781, 816 (2009).
504. See Gajda, supra note 6, at 1068.
505. FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2009.
506. PEW RESEARCH CTR., VIEWS OF THE NEWS MEDIA: 1985-2011, at 9 (2011), available at
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/9-22-2011%20Media%20Attitudes%20Release.pdf
(noting that a significant majority of the American public thinks that news stories are inaccurate
and that the news is biased; the proportion of the public saying that the press is "immoral" is at
an all-time high).
507. "The press, after all, has a better mechanism for testing newsworthiness than do the
courts." Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 353. Prosser remarked, "To a very great extent the press,
with its experience or instinct as to what its readers will want, has succeeded in making its own
definition of news. A glance at any morning newspaper will sufficiently indicate the content of
the term." Prosser, supra note 8, at 412.
508. Smolla, supra note 7, at 302; see also Edelman, supra note 17, at 1230.
509. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). The Court has recognized the social value of
public exposure to a wide array of topics. Matters of public concern encompasses "expression
about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters," commercial speech,
and sexual matter-"far more than politics in a narrow sense." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971); see also Va.
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stitutional guarantees of free speech. Matters of general
newsworthiness, however, do not necessarily promote the same val-
ues.510 The replacement of newsworthiness with a more substantive
matters of public concern standard would align the privacy tort not
only with the aims of freedom of speech, but also public opinion, at a
time of rising public dissatisfaction with the trivialization of the
news. 511
Another assumption that should be revisited is the notion, dating
from the early years of photojournalism, that one waives his or her
right to privacy by appearing in public and that privacy cannot be vio-
lated in a public place. 512 As many have noted, this binary, locational
model of privacy does not map onto the way that privacy is generally
understood and experienced in real life.5 13 We are all aware of cir-
cumstances in which privacy can be violated even though the subject is
in public-when an intimate or private scene such as a funeral is put
on display, for example, or when the body is exposed in a state of
illness or vulnerability. A more useful model would define privacy, as
does philosopher Helen Nissenbaum, contextually and situationally-
invasions of privacy occur when information flows out of context, in
ways that are inappropriate under the norms and expectations of any
given situation. 514 Another approach is conceiving privacy in terms of
"zones of intimacy." These zones, to quote Thomas Emerson, would
encompass "those activities, ideas, or emotions which one does not
share with others or shares only with those who are closest," including
matters such as sexual relations, bodily functions, and family rela-
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
510. As Edward Bloustein observed:
Whatever is published may indeed be newsworthy, in the sense of satisfying the pub-
lic interest or curiosity. It is also certainly the case that the press should be the final
arbiter of newsworthiness, of what is worth reporting . . But neither of these state-
ments is the same as saying that the press is the final arbiter of newsworthiness in the
sense of determining what the public must be informed of for the purposes of fulfilling
its self-governing functions.
BLOUSTEIN, supra note 156, at 83.
511. See Blackman, supra note 6, at 379-80; Solove, supra note 6, at 987-88. California's
newsworthiness test requires consideration of the social worth of the public disclosure. Its
"three part test for newsworthiness" is comprised of (1) the social value of the facts published;
(2) the depth of intrusion into ostensibly private affairs; and (3) the extent to which an individual
voluntarily acceded to a position of notoriety. See Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469,
483-84 (Cal. 1998).
512. "Tort law clings stubbornly to the principle that privacy cannot be invaded in or from a
public space." McClurg, supra note 6, at 990.
513. Richards & Solove, supra note 4, at 1889.
514. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 6, at 96-98.
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tions.515 These contextual approaches recognize that privacy may
have only a tangential relationship to physical space and that our lives
are lived neither strictly in private nor in public, but rather in grey,
fluid, intermediate domains.
The desensitization argument dates back to the mid-twentieth cen-
tury: because exposing one's feelings and aspects of one's private life
had become a normal part of constructing a public identity, because
celebrity was glamorous, because the private home had been "in-
vaded" by mass communications, and because the collection of per-
sonal information by the state had become routine, most people did
not mind putting their private affairs on display and perhaps even
sought to be publicized. While it may have been true at the time that
there was less sensitivity and embarrassment around revealing aspects
of private life than in the past, this argument failed to acknowledge
the important difference between sharing one's intimacies with a lim-
ited public and having one's private affairs broadcast to a mass audi-
ence of strangers.516
Context matters and the medium matters. Warren and Brandeis
were particularly attuned to the threats to privacy posed by candid
photography. As Andrew McClurg observes, film and video's "capac-
ity to capture not just a single image of a person, but much of her
personality," magnified those harms.517 As Danielle Citron notes,
while the injuries inflicted by twentieth-century media were often
temporary-films appeared in theaters for a limited time and newspa-
pers remained in circulation for only a few days-"[t]he searchable,
permanent nature of the internet extends the life and audience of pri-
vacy disclosures, and exacerbates individuals' emotional and reputa-
tional injuries."518 Although most of us are comfortable divulging
secrets to friends and even disclosing personal data to the govern-
ment, to companies, and to researchers-and revealing much, perhaps
too much, online-this does not translate into a willingness to be ex-
posed to any audience in any medium.
515. Thomas I. Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of Press, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 329, 343 (1979); see also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 (1975) ("[Plowerful
arguments ... have been made, that ... there is a zone of privacy surrounding every individual, a
zone within which the State may protect him from intrusion by the press . . . ."); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("Various guarantees [of the Constitution] create zones of
privacy.").
516. See Gavison, supra note 16, at 469 ("[Slignificant media exposure is humiliating, one-
dimensional, and offensive even if it is accurate and sympathetic.").
517. McClurg, supra note 6, at 1043.
518. Citron, supra note 5, at 1808.
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Again, it is useful to remember origins: many of the features of
modern privacy law date back to the early years of the "culture of
exposure," when fame, celebrity, and publicizing the personality were
viewed with a certain amount of optimism and possibility. This out-
look, and the era's fears of press censorship, may explain why the
courts of that time were inclined to minimize the harms of unwanted
public exposure of one's image and private life. Today, in an entirely
different cultural and communicative environment, when the stakes of
privacy invasions are much greater, we should not fall into the trap of
believing that because we expose ourselves in some contexts it is a
desirable prospect under every circumstance.
The present privacy panic offers possibilities for creative thinking
and significant legal growth and development. In this moment of
heightened sensitivity to privacy concerns, it is both appropriate and
necessary to question the premises and assumptions of privacy law.
This Article has illustrated some of those assumptions and their his-
torical origins. In doing so it has attempted to make at least two
points clear. One is that the law has been generally inattentive to pri-
vacy's lived, situational aspects. It has also been insensitive to pri-
vacy's broader sociohistorical contexts. Our privacy needs and our
understandings of privacy at any given time reflect societal norms, the
state of technology, and the cultural and informational environment-
rapidly evolving, highly volatile forces. The law has lacked similar
dynamism.
We should recognize privacy's historical and cultural contingencies,
the doctrine's flawed premises, and the need for greater nuance and
precision in the law. Like all values worth protecting, privacy cannot
be defined in rigid, binary terms, reduced to simple formulae, or fro-
zen in time. The protection of privacy should be envisioned in holistic
terms; the law is part of a system for the protection of privacy that
implicates technology, social norms, and media practices, and it may
have a heightened role to play when other protections fail. While the
exigencies of the present moment demand innovation in the law, there
is also much to be had from the insights of the generation that first
identified the need for a right to be "let alone." Their primary contri-
bution to the present discussion may not be so much in rules and tech-
nicalities, but in "taking the harmfulness of invasion of privacy
seriously." 519
519. Gavison, supra note 16, at 467.
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